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ABSTRACT
This article examines and compares the partial defense of
provocation as it applies to domestic homicide in the United States,
Canada and Australia. It looks at both the male-gendered basis for
provocation of jealous rage and the female-gendered basis of fear.
The article explains why substantive equality, prevalent under
Canadian constitutional law, has not resulted in woman-friendly
provocation rules in Canada. It also explains why Australia, instead of
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the United States or Canada, is the leader in incorporating substantive
equality into its provocation doctrine. It concludes that the main
reason that some Australian jurisdictions have abolished provocation
and others have woman-friendly versions of the doctrine is because,
unlike Canada and the United States, some Australian states do not
have mandatory minimum sentencing for either murder or
manslaughter. It further concludes that current social norms have
incorporated substantive equality into the application of provocation
law in all three countries, and that therefore, there may not be as
great a need to reform the law of provocation as there has been in the
past.
***

The laws that are going to be amended in this area will one day, in
the not-too-distant future, be spoken about by me and other people
to the amazement of our daughters and their friends. They will be
amazed that these laws ever existed. I will talk about the fact that a
law existed that provided . . . a partial excuse, for killing a domestic
partner . . . based on the notion that it was understandable that the
accused lost control and became so violent as to kill their partner
because their relationship was under threat.1

INTRODUCTION
Men who commit domestic homicide by killing intimate or former
intimate partners often do so out of jealousy, possessiveness and
rage—in the heat of passion.2 Women who commit domestic
homicide often kill out of fear and despair—they kill their batterers.3
Both men and women frequently assert the partial defense of
provocation for this ultimate act of domestic violence.4 If provocation
1. Crimes (Homicide) Bill: Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Before the
Victorian Legislative Assembly, 55th Parliament, 1838 (Oct. 26, 2005) (Vic.)
(statement of Maxine Morand, Member of Victoria’s Legislative Assembly)
(commenting on Victoria’s Crimes (Homicide) Bill during the debate over abolishing
provocation).
2. See Jenny Morgan, Critique and Comment, Provocation Law and Facts: Dead
Women Tell No Tales, Tales Are Told About Them, 21 MELB. U. L. REV. 237, 256
(1997) (citing NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM COMM’N, DISCUSSION PAPER 31,
PROVOCATION, DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY & INFANTICIDE 3.98 (1993) [hereinafter NEW
SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM COMM’N]).
3. See id. at 256-57.
4. The other situation where provocation is frequently asserted is homicide as a
result of a fight between men. See, e.g., NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM COMM’N,
supra note 2, at 3.8.
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is found, it reduces murder to manslaughter, which usually results in a
substantially shorter prison sentence.5 Two gender equality issues are
presented by this reality, both relating to domestic violence. First, why
should jealous killers be allowed to argue provocation when their
victims did nothing legally wrong? Second, why are most battered
women who kill their batterers not fully excused based on selfdefense?
Two visions of gender equality, formal and substantive,6 can be
used to analyze the criminal defense of provocation as applied in
domestic homicide cases.
Formal equality means equality of
treatment so that like cases are treated alike. Under formal gender
equality, the same legal rule applies to men and women when both
sexes engage in similar conduct or are similarly situated.7 This is
often effective in breaking down gender stereotypes, for example, by
allowing women to be executors of estates8 or attend state military
academies.9 However, formal equality is problematic when used to
justify retaining certain male-biased defenses, and expanding their
application to women rather than abolishing them. Provocation,
when applied in domestic homicide cases, is such a defense.
Unlike formal equality, substantive equality seeks to accommodate
the varied needs and experiences of subordinated groups.10
Substantive gender equality insists that the law take into account and
respond to the actual effect of a rule on both men and women,

5. See CAROLINE A. FORELL & DONNA M. MATTHEWS, A LAW OF HER OWN: THE
REASONABLE WOMAN AS A MEASURE OF MAN 173-74 (New York Univ. Press 2000).
6. See KATHARINE T. BARTLETT ET AL., GENDER AND LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE,
COMMENTARY 265 (3d ed. 2002) (distinguishing between the two visions of equality
described by one group of commentators as follows: “[w]hile formal sex equality
judges the form of a rule, requiring that it treat women and men on the same terms
without special barriers or favors on account of their sex, substantive equality looks to
a rule’s results or effects.”).
7. See FORELL & MATTHEWS, supra note 5, at 14 (explaining that although the
same laws are applied to men and women under formal gender equality, the laws may
punish women for not being men in areas “where consensus and commonality
between men and woman simply do not exist”).
8. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971) (applying heightened scrutiny
for the first time to gender discrimination where a statute gave mandatory preference
to fathers over mothers as administrators of deceased child's estate). The Court held
that dissimilar treatment for men and women who are similarly situated violates the
Equal Protection Clause. Id.
9. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 557-58 (1996) (applying
heightened scrutiny to Virginia Military Institute’s sex-based admissions policy and
holding that denying women admittance because of their gender violates the Equal
Protection Clause).
10. See Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, A Conversation About Equality, 29 DENV. J. INT’L
L. & POL’Y 65, 69 (2000) (remarking that: “equality isn’t just about being treated the
same, and it isn’t a mathematical equation waiting to be solved. Rather, it is about
equal human dignity, and full membership in society.”).
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thereby better assuring that justice for all is achieved.11 It requires
more than just making the provocation defense available to both men
and women who kill out of jealousy and rage, or out of fear and
despair. Instead, applying substantive equality would mean that
killing in a heat of passion out of sexual possessiveness would no
longer be an acceptable basis for a claim of provocation because
everyone has a right to sexual and physical autonomy. Applying
substantive equality would also mean that killing one’s batterer out of
fear would often be a basis for self-defense because everyone has a
right to defend him or herself from physical harm. If substantive
gender equality were considered adequately, killings out of jealousy
and rage would result in murder convictions,12 while most killings out
of fear and despair would result in acquittals.13
With these desired substantive gender equality outcomes in mind,
this article examines and compares the law of provocation as it applies
to domestic homicide in United States, Canada and the Australia.14
Every state, province and territory, with the exceptions of the
Australian states of Tasmania and Victoria, retains some form of the
provocation defense or, in some American states, the Model Penal
Code’s even more pro-defendant extreme emotional disturbance
defense.15 This article examines why substantive equality, prevalent
under Canadian constitutional law,16 has not resulted in more
woman-friendly provocation rules in Canada and why Australia is the
leader in incorporating substantive equality into its provocation
doctrine.

11. See id. (noting that an examination of substantive rights violations must
consider the treatment of the different groups within the context of society, as
differential treatment in some instances may lead to substantive equality, while similar
treatment in other cases may lead to substantive inequality).
12. See id. at 178; see also VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM'N, DEFENCES TO
HOMICIDE FINAL REPORT xv (Oct. 2004) [hereinafter VICTORIAN LAW REFORM
COMM’N],http://www.lawreform.vic.gov.au/CA256902000FE154/Lookup/Homicide
_ Final_Report/$file/FinalReport.pdf.
13. See FORELL & MATTHEWS, supra note 5, at 214.
14. Provocation is an area where the constitutional doctrine of equal protection
has played little or no part in the development of the law. Therefore, this article
examines whether the statutes and case law in these areas are gender-biased and how
much formal or substantive gender equality exists.
15. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (2004). The Code prescribes that:
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when . . . (b) a homicide
which would otherwise be murder is committed under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable
explanation or excuse. The reasonableness of such explanation or excuse
shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation
under the circumstances as he believes them to be.
Id.
16. See infra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
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I. PROVOCATION OVERVIEW
The origins of the provocation defense are deeply gendered; it was
created for and has always been used far more often by men than
women.
Well before any of the three countries achieved
independence from England, the provocation defense began as a
common law doctrine about men defending their honor.17 Until the
nineteenth century, provocation rules explicitly treated men and
women differently. In the domestic homicide context, the defense
was limited to men and was only available when husbands killed after
finding their wives in the act of adultery.18 Over time, the defense of
provocation came to excuse “heat of passion” rather than honor.19
The defense has further evolved so that today any form of perceived
infidelity or attempt to leave an intimate relationship may suffice to
support a “heat of passion” claim.20 Thus, the provocation defense has
17. See Bernard J. Brown, The Demise of Chance Medley and the Recognition of
Provocation as a Defence to Murder in English Law, 7 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 310, 312-13
(1963) (noting that killing during “embroilments to settle so-called ‘breaches of
honour’” was excusable during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in England
because of the absence of malice and the existence of provocation serious enough to
deprive one of their self-control).
18. See R. v. Mawgridge, (1707) 84 Eng. Rep. 1107, 1114-15 (K.B. U.K.)
(including provocation in the adultery context for the first time). Lord Holt CJ
defined the categories of conduct for which provocation was available to include
“when a man is taken in adultery . . . with another man’s wife, if the husband shall
stab the adulterer, or knock out his brains, this is bare manslaughter: for jealousy is
the rage of a man, and adultery is the highest invasion of property.” Id. at 1115; Ian
Leader-Elliot, Passion and Insurrection in the Law of Sexual Provocation, in SEXING
THE SUBJECT OF LAW 149, 153 (Ngaire Naffine & Rosemary J. Owens eds., LBC
Information Services 1997) (suggesting that originally provocation based on
witnessing adultery was only available to the husband for killing his sexual rival not his
wife). Leader-Elliot refers to two English cases, R. v. Pearson, (1835) 168 Eng. Rep.
1133 (U.K.) and R. v. Kelly, (1848) 175 Eng. Rep. 342 (Monmouth Assizes U.K.),
where the law allowed provocation for killing the unfaithful wife. Id. at 157; see also
CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN 19 (New York Univ. Press 2003)
(describing other bases for provocation that do not involve domestic homicide such
as aggravated assault or battery, mutual combat, commission of a serious crime
against a close relative of the defendant and illegal arrest). Today, provocation is
often argued in the context of mutual combat situations such as bar brawls. In these
contexts, both the parties are usually male.
19. Many provocation statutes expressly include the phrase “heat of passion.”
See, e.g., Criminal Code, 1913, § 281 (W. Austl.) (stating that “[w]hen a person who
unlawfully kills another . . . does the act which causes death in the heat of passion
caused by sudden provocation, and before there is time for his passion to cool, he is
guilty of manslaughter only.”) (emphasis added); Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch.
C-34, § 232 (1974) (determining that “[c]ulpable homicide that otherwise would be
murder may be reduced to manslaughter if the person who committed it did so in the
heat of passion caused by sudden provocation.”) (emphasis added); see also ALASKA
STAT. § 11.41.115(a) (1980) (asserting that “[i]n a prosecution [for murder], it is a
defense that the defendant acted in a heat of passion, before there had been a
reasonable opportunity for the passion to cool, when the heat of passion resulted
from a serious provocation by the intended victim.”) (emphasis added).
20. See Victoria Nourse, Passion’s Progress: Modern Law Reform and the
Provocation Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1355-56 (1997).
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continued to be specially designed for men.
Despite the intent of the provocation defense to provide a
concession to a human frailty that is more typically male, today the
rare woman who kills out of rage and jealousy, theoretically, can also
use the defense.21 Therefore, even though the vast majority of people
who kill their partners or former partners out of rage, jealousy or hurt
pride are men, provocation law now provides a version of formal
equality.22 However, equality considerations under the provocation
doctrine have not been limited solely to allowing women to assert the
same heat of passion rationale as men. Substantive equality has
played an important role in the recent development of provocation
doctrine. In all three countries, the provocation defense can now be
asserted when a person kills in an emotional state other than rage and
jealousy, most notably fear, which is much more likely to be an
emotion on which a battered woman would base her claim.23
Expanding provocation’s rationales to mitigate the punishment of
these women, rather than exonerating them through self-defense,
amounts to only partial progress towards full substantive equality.24
However, progress it is.
Another area where substantive equality may have influenced the
provocation doctrine is the relaxation or elimination of the
traditional requirements that there was no time to cool off between
the provocation and the killing,25 and that there was some particular
triggering incident.26 These changes, which have been recognized in
some American and many Australian jurisdictions,27 sometimes work
21. See LEE, supra note 18, at 26; see also Morgan, supra note 2, at 256 (noting
that the author “found no reported Australian cases where women were provoked
into killing men who left them or who ‘confessed adultery.’”). I say “theoretically”
because there is evidence that juries are less sympathetic to women than to men who
kill intimates out of rage and jealousy. LEE, supra note 18, at 52. It was not until 1946
that England acknowledged that a woman who killed her husband when he was
engaged in adultery could use the provocation defense. See Holmes v. Dir. of Pub.
Prosecutions, [1946] A.C. 588, 592 (U.K.).
22. See Victoria Nourse, Upending Status: A Comment on Switching, Inequality,
and the Idea of the Reasonable Person, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 361, 365 (2004). See
generally FORELL & MATTHEWS, supra note 5.
23. See, e.g., Van Den Hoek v. The Queen (1986) 161 C.L.R. 158, ¶ 17 (Austl.)
(Mason, J.). See generally Caroline Forell, Homicide and the Unreasonable Man, 72
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 597 (2004) (reviewing CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE
MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM (New York Univ. Press 2003)).
24. See infra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
25. See LEE, supra note 18, at 44 (noting that the requirement that there be no
time to cool off is part of the modern test for provocation except under the Model
Penal Code’s extreme emotional disturbance test).
26. See, e.g., Crimes Act, 1900, § 13(2)(b) (Austl. Cap. Terr.) (stating that the
provoking conduct can have “occurred immediately before the act or omission
causing death or at any previous time.”).
27. See, e.g., Crimes Act, 1900, § 23(2) (N.S.W.); Crimes Act, 1900, § 13(2)
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in favor of battered women who kill—for example, in cases where a
battered woman kills her batterer while he is asleep.28 However,
because these changes are not limited to situations where a battered
woman kills out of fear, they also benefit people who kill out of
jealousy. One of the most notorious and oft-discussed provocation
cases is People v. Berry.29 In Berry, expanding the cooling off period
under the traditional provocation test benefited a man who killed his
wife in the heat of passion.30 In another case involving male rage and
jealousy, Parker v. R.,31 the Privy Council reversed the majority
decision of the Australian High Court, agreeing with the dissenting
judges that provocation’s “no time to cool off” requirement be
relaxed.32 Thus, these changes are not particularly good examples of
substantive equality.
II. THE PROVOCATION DIVIDE
Today, both men and women can base their provocation claim on
either jealous rage or fear. However, the gendered reality is that the
bases for asserting the provocation defense in domestic homicide
cases are sex-segregated. Men almost exclusively use heat of passion
based on jealousy while women almost exclusively use fear. For
different reasons, both male-gendered heat of passion and femalegendered fear are likely to continue to be allowed as justifications for
a provocation defense in the United States, Canada and most
Australian jurisdictions.
(Austl. Cap. Terr.); see also VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 12, at 24, 52.
28. See, e.g., R. v. Muy Ky Chhay (1994) 72 A. Crim. R. 1 (Austl.) (finding that
cumulative acts of domestic violence could cause sufficient loss of control that a
woman could be acting in self-defense when she kills her sleeping husband); see also
State v. Felton, 329 N.W.2d 161, 174 (Wis. 1983) (holding that a long history of
abuse, and provocation on day of the shooting, was sufficient to raise a jury question
as to heat of passion despite the fact the victim was asleep when his wife shot him).
29. 556 P.2d 777 (Cal. 1976). Some of the recent California cases that discuss
Berry involve heat of passion killings where the jury was instructed on provocation,
yet found that the evidence supported a murder verdict. This bolsters the argument I
make later in the article, see infra notes 90-103 and accompanying text, that even
though juries are being given provocation instructions, they are finding that heat of
passion is not a valid basis for finding provocation. See, e.g., People v. Williams, No.
A094710, 2003 WL 21246611 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. May 30, 2003); People v.
Pemberton, Nos. C036700, C037010, 2002 WL 436959 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2002).
30. See LEE, supra note 18, at 44 (noting that the cooling off period in Berry was
so elastic as to allow a husband to claim heat of passion two weeks after learning of his
wife’s infidelity); see also Rebecca Bradfield, Domestic Homicide and the Defence of
Provocation: A Tasmanian Perspective on the Jealous Husband and the Battered
Wife, 19 U. TAS. L. REV. 5, 13 (2000). Under the more modern and pro-defendant
Model Penal Code the cooling off period requirement has been completely
eliminated. See LEE, supra note 18, at 44 (noting that had Berry arisen in a Model
Penal Code state, no cooling off period would have been required).
31. See (1964) A.C. 1369, rev’g (1963) 111 C.L.R. 610 (Austl.).
32. See Parker (1964) A.C. at 1369.
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In all three countries, approximately three-quarters of the
perpetrators of domestic homicide are male.33 Many of these men
have previously committed violence against their female victims.34
Nevertheless, they are frequently permitted to use the provocation
defense even when the female victims’ “provoking” conduct was a
lawful exercise of sexual or personal autonomy, such as sexual
intercourse with another or leaving the relationship.35
Most
jurisdictions continue to provide this broadened version of the
traditional provocation defense as a “concession to human frailty.”36
As this article will show, the harshness of lengthy mandatory
minimum sentences for murder is likely the decisive reason why this
trend has continued unabated in Canada and the United States, but
not in some Australian jurisdictions where such determinate
sentencing has been abolished.
Women commit domestic homicide much less frequently than do
men.37 When they do kill, they usually kill their batterers out of fear
and despair. In all three countries, battered women who kill routinely
rely on provocation or some other basis for reducing murder to
manslaughter38 because their often more appropriate claims of self-

33. See CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, CRIME DATA BRIEF, NCJ 197838, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, 1993-2001
(2003) [hereinafter CRIME DATE BRIEF], available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
pub/pdf/ipv01.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2005); see also ANDRÉE CÔTÉ ET AL., NAT’L
ASS’N OF WOMEN AND THE LAW, STOP EXCUSING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1.2 (2000),
available at http://www.nawl.ca/provocation.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2005);
Morgan, supra note 2, at 239. Men most frequently commit homicides of both sexes,
while the vast majority of homicide victims are male. See, e.g., JOHN KAPLAN ET AL.,
CRIMINAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 388-89 (Aspen Publishers 2000) (1986); JENNY
MOUZOS, 2003-2004 NAT’L HOMICIDE MONITORING PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT,
HOMICIDE IN AUSTRALIA 11, 17 (2004).
34. See CÔTÉ ET AL., supra note 33, at 1.2 (noting that one third of women killed
by their spouses in Ontario had previously reported domestic violence to the police,
and that if unreported cases were included, a large majority of cases of spousal
homicide would be preceded by male violence).
35. See Nourse, supra note 20, at 1407-08.
36. VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 12, at 23 (citing R. v. Kirkham,
(1837) 173 Eng. Rep. 422, 424 (U.K.)); see also Parker (1963) 111 C.L.R. at 652
(quoting East’s Pleas of the Crown (1803) vol. 1, 238) (stating to have received “such
a provocation as the law presumes might in human frailty heat the blood to a
proportionable degree of resentment, and keep it boiling to the moment of the
fact.”).
37. See CRIME DATA BRIEF, supra note 33.
38. For example, in Australia, battered women who kill may also argue lack of
intent to kill, diminished responsibility and excessive self-defense. See VICTORIAN LAW
REFORM COMM’N, supra note 12, at 97-98; FORELL & MATTHEWS, supra note 5, at 164;
Rebecca Bradfield, The Treatment of Women Who Kill Their Male Partners Within
the Australian Criminal Justice System 104-08 (2002) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis,
University of Tasmania) (on file with the American University Journal of Gender,
Social Policy & the Law).
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defense, that would result in acquittal, fail.39 Thus, provocation is
usually viewed as a backup defense for battered women.
Battered women’s self-defense claims too frequently fail because,
like provocation, self-defense was designed with men’s conduct in
mind. Self-defense is based on a “male code of combat.”40 Thus,
when a battered woman uses a gun or knife to kill her unarmed
batterer, or kills him when he is asleep or otherwise unaware of her
attack, a judge may decline to give a self-defense jury instruction
because the defendant’s conduct fails to fit the requirements of the
jurisdiction’s self-defense rule. Similarly, if a judge gives a self-defense
instruction to a jury, the jury may find that the defendant’s conduct
does not meet the requirements of the rule. Even if a battered
woman’s conduct does fit within the jurisdiction’s self-defense rule, a
jury may decide that her deadly response was not justified under
current social norms.41 As one commentator notes:
The continued association of self-defence with a . . . confrontation
will continue to make it difficult for jurors to identify actions taken
in self-protection as ‘self-defence’ outside this context. This may
particularly disadvantage those responding to an ongoing threat of
harm, rather than a single attack or threat of violence, and those
who kill in non-confrontational circumstances.
. . . [In the context of family violence] where a person’s actions
have been carried out in fear for their lives and under a belief there
is no alternative, self-defence should not be excluded simply
because he or she killed in non-confrontational circumstances or in
response to an ongoing threat of violence, rather than an
immediate attack.42
39. See R. v. M., [1998] D.L.R. (4th) 513 (Can.) (L’Heureux-Dubé, J.,
concurring); ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING
118-20 (Yale Univ. Press 2000).
40. See FORELL & MATTHEWS, supra note 5, at 201; see also REGINA GRAYCAR &
JENNY MORGAN, THE HIDDEN GENDER OF LAW 438-40 (2d ed., The Federation Press
2002).
41. See VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 12, at 83; see also FORELL &
MATTHEWS, supra note 5, at 216-17.
42. VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 12, at 68; see FORELL &
MATTHEWS, supra note 5, at 201-02; see also Osland v. R. (1998) 197 C.L.R. 316, 37576 (Austl.) (footnotes omitted) (expressing concerns among both laypeople and
those that are legally trained that too liberal a self-defense rule would allow battered
women to engage in violent self-help). Justice Kirby of the Australian High Court
held:
No civilised society removes its protection to human life simply because of
the existence of a history of long-term physical or psychological abuse. If it
were so, it would expose to unsanctioned homicide a large number of
persons who, in the nature of things, would not be able to give their version
of the facts. The law expects a greater measure of self-control in unwanted
situations where human life is at stake. It reserves cases of provocation and
self-defence to truly exceptional circumstances. Whilst these circumstances
may be affected by contemporary conditions and attitudes, there is no legal
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Rebecca Bradfield’s study of sixty-five Australian Supreme Court
cases43 where battered women killed their husbands over the period
between 1980 and 2000 illustrates the difficulties in obtaining a selfdefense verdict.44 Of the twenty-one cases where battered women
raised self-defense, only nine were acquitted, while eleven were
convicted of manslaughter and one of murder.45 Obviously, a
successful provocation claim, while perhaps not providing a battered
woman with complete justice, will often provide a fairer result than a
finding of murder.
Bradfield’s study further demonstrates the importance of
provocation to battered women. In all twenty-two cases where a
battered woman claimed provocation at trial, she was successful.46
The provocation defense, therefore, provided battered women an
important fallback option. However, this was not true for men who
claimed provocation.47 Men received a manslaughter verdict in only
eight out of fifteen cases where provocation based on jealous rage was
argued at trial.48
Although imperfect, the provocation defense makes manslaughter,
which carries a substantially shorter sentence than murder, a viable
outcome for battered women. This presents a dilemma for those who
seek to reform criminal law to ensure that battered women who kill
are treated justly, while at the same time eliminating the jealous heat
of passion basis for a manslaughter verdict. What happens to battered
women if provocation is abolished and therefore no longer available
to them? One possibility is that acquittal based on a successful selfdefense claim will replace it as the most common outcome. Another
possibility is that other defenses such as diminished capacity will take
up the slack for provocation. However, another possibility is the
substantial increase in murder convictions.
Men’s heat of passion and women’s fear are both likely to continue
carte blanche, including for people in abusive relationships, to engage in
premeditated homicide. Nor in my view should there be.
Id. at 375.
43. See generally Australian Gov’t, Attorney-General’s Dep’t, Australia’s Legal
System, http://www.nla.gov.au/oz/law.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2006) (explaining
that Supreme Courts are the highest state appellate courts in Australia).
44. See Bradfield, supra note 38, at 194.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 144-45. Bradfield also notes that in sixty-five out of seventy-six cases
where a woman killed her husband or ex-husband, there was a history of physical
violence. Id. at 22.
47. See id. at 145.
48. See id.; see also Elizabeth Sheehy, Battered Women and Mandatory Minimum
Sentences, 39 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 529, 531 (2001) (noting that “none [of the many
strategies to reform self defense] can be credited with achieving any marked increase
in acquittals for battered women on trial.”).
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to be allowed as bases for provocation in most jurisdictions because
lengthy mandatory minimum sentences for murder are deemed too
harsh. These mandatory sentences, along with the frequent failure of
self-defense claims when battered women kill out of fear, make a
manslaughter option necessary.49 However, permitting both heat of
passion and fear as bases for a provocation defense may be less
problematic than it first appears. There is intriguing evidence that
even in Canada and the United States, where the goal of substantive
gender equality has had little effect on the law of provocation, the
feminist critiques of the past thirty years have combined with
changing social values to influence the application of the provocation
defense by prosecutors, judges, and juries. As this article will show,
evolving community assessments of violence arising out of
possessiveness and violence resulting from fear may frequently be
resulting in substantive gender equality under provocation and other
criminal law rules that were created with men in mind.
III. DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES AMONG THE THREE COUNTRIES
Certain commonalities exist that may be relevant to how
provocation claims are treated. All three nations have their legal
roots in English common law and have constitutions creating federal
systems that divide government between the centralized national
government and states or provinces. As a result, a variety of different
jurisdictions within each country make and apply criminal law,
including the provocation defense. In all three countries, feminist
legal scholars, lawyers and jurists have vigorously critiqued the
traditional provocation doctrine,50 and thus, helped shape both
current provocation law and social norms concerning violence based
on jealousy and violence based on fear.
Differences among the three legal systems may affect their
provocation rules. While Canada has one federal provocation statute
49. See Bradfield, supra note 38, at 108-28 (contending that lack of intent is the
most frequent basis for domestic homicide manslaughter conviction for women).
50. See, e.g., CÔTÉ ET AL, supra note 33 (writing in the United States); FORELL &
MATTHEWS, supra note 5, at 196; Adrian Howe, Provoking Comment: The Question of
Gender Bias in the Provocation Defence—A Victorian Case Study, in AUSTRALIAN
WOMEN: CONTEMPORARY FEMINIST THOUGHT 230-31 (Norma Grieve and Ailsa Burns
eds., 1994) (writing in Australia); LEE, supra note 18, at 276-78; STANLEY M.H. YEO,
UNRESTRAINED KILLINGS AND THE LAW: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE LAWS OF
PROVOCATION AND EXCESSIVE SELF-DEFENSE IN INDIA, ENGLAND, AND AUSTRALIA 182-83
(Rajeev Dhavan et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1998); Bradfield, supra, note 30, at 5;
Wayne Gorman, Provocation: The Jealous Husband Defence, 42 CRIM. L. Q. 478, 499500 (1999) (writing in Canada); Edward M. Hyland, R. v. Thibert: Are There Any
Ordinary People Left, 28 OTTAWA L. REV. 145, 168-69 (1997); Morgan, supra note 2;
Nourse, supra note 20, at 1339-42; Gary T. Trotter, Anger, Provocation, and the
Intent for Murder, 47 MCGILL L.J. 669, 688 (2002).
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for the entire nation, separate provocation rules exist in each of the
fifty American states and eight Australian states and territories. As a
result, in the United States and Canada there is an opportunity for
concurrently developing different legal rules concerning domestic
homicide.51 Furthermore, as courts of final review of state criminal
cases, Australia’s and Canada’s highest federal courts have decided a
number of provocation cases, providing guidance on the issue at a
national level. In contrast, the United States Supreme Court lacks
jurisdiction to review homicide cases concerning provocation because
provocation typically does not involve a constitutional or federal
issue.52 Because criminal law is an area traditionally reserved to the
states, in the United States there is little judicial guidance concerning
provocation doctrine from federal courts.
A potentially important difference when it comes to gender and
equality analysis is the gender make-up of the judiciary, especially the
highest appellate court.53 Even when, as in the United States, the
highest federal court does not review provocation cases, the Court’s
views on gender equality influence other legal decision-makers. The
women who have been on the bench have often been staunch
proponents of gender equality and, therefore, their presence may
make a difference in how equality analysis applies to gender
discrimination and evolves over time.54
51. In the United States, there are two sets of “heat of passion” rules: traditional
provocation rules and the Model Penal Code’s Extreme Emotional Disturbance
provision. See infra Part IV. In Australia there are at least four different ways that
states deal with provocation. See infra Part VI.
52. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (noting the power of Supreme Court and other
federal courts to adjudicate constitutional and federal claims; claims between states;
claims between a state and citizens of another state; claims between citizens of
different states; and claims between a state or its citizens and foreign governments or
their citizens). But see Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (holding that due
process mandates that the prosecution bear the burden of proving the absence of
provocation).
53. See generally Fred O. Smith, Note, Gendered Justice: Do Male and Female
Judges Rule Differently on Questions of Gay Rights?, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 2087, 2090-97
(2005).
54. Female Justices have played major roles in cases that favor women’s rights.
See, e.g., Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed., 125 S. Ct. 1497, 1509-10 (2005)
(upholding a suit for retaliation under Title IX, where Justice Ginsburg joined Justice
O’Connor’s five to four opinion allowing a male coach to sue after he was allegedly
fired for complaining about sex discrimination against his public high school female
basketball team); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 557 (1996) (shifting the
line between intermediate scrutiny for gender and strict scrutiny for race in Justice
Ginsburg’s majority opinion requiring an all-male state military school to admit
women); Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22, 25 (1993) (exemplifying
Justice O’Connor and Justice Ginsburg’s commitment in advancing women’s interests
in the area of sexual harassment); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846
(1992) (showing Justice O’Connor’s influence in preserving the right to abortion by
upholding Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)); see also Diana Majury, The Charter,
Equality Rights, and Women: Equivocation and Celebration, 40 OSGOODE HALL L.J.
297, 312-13 (2002) (recounting female judges making a difference in Canadian
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The gender make-up of the highest courts in Australia, Canada and
the United States is quite different. While the Australian High Court
has previously included one female member,55 currently there are
none.56 At present, the United States Supreme Court includes only
one female member, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. She is one of
America’s leading proponents of feminist formal equality that focuses
on eliminating gender stereotypes.57
The membership of the Canadian Supreme Court differs
significantly from the Australian High Court and the United States
Supreme Court. Currently it has four female members, including the
Chief Justice.58 Furthermore, up until Justice Claire L’HeureuxDubé’s retirement in 2002, she was a highly influential judicial
proponent of substantive equality.59 The difference in representation
of women on each nation’s highest court is consistent with the
differences in overall representation of women as senior judges in the
three countries. In 2003, only 14.6% of the Australian senior judiciary
was female60 while women represented 24% of the U.S. federal
judiciary in 200561 and 26% of the Canadian appellate bench in
1999.62
The three countries also differ on how constitutional law treats
gender equality. Although the different impact that the provocation
defense has on women and men is not likely to be considered a
equality analysis). See generally Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Female Judges Do Matter:
Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J.
1759 (2005) (finding that female judges mattered to outcomes in Title VII sexual
harassment and sex discrimination cases).
55. Justice Mary Gaudron was the only female justice sitting on the Australian
High Court. See generally Osland v. R. (1998) 197 C.L.R. 316 (Austl.) (Gaudron, J.)
(expounding on provocation and battered women).
56. See Rachel Davis & George Williams, A Century of Appointments but Only
One Woman, 28 ALTERNATIVE L.J. 54, 54 (2003) (noting that since Justice Mary
Gaudron’s retirement in 2003, no other women have joined the court).
57. See Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REV. 803,
829-31 (1990); see also Kathryn A. Lee, Note, Intermediate Review “With Teeth” in
Gender Discrimination Cases: The New Standard in United States v. Virginia, 7 TEMP.
POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 221, 225, n.35 (1997). Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, the first
woman appointed to the United States Supreme Court, submitted her resignation in
2005 and was replaced by Justice Samuel Alito in February 2006.
58. The nine current Justices of the Canadian Supreme Court include the
following female justices: Chief Justice Beverly McLachlin, Justice Marie Deschamps,
Justice Rosalie Abella and Justice Louise Charron.
59. See Majury, supra note 54, at 311.
60. See Davis & Williams, supra note 56, at 56.
61. See FEMINIST MAJORITY FOUND., WOMEN STILL UNDERREPRESENTED ON THE
FEDERAL BENCH, July 5, 2005, http://www.feminist.org/news/newsbyte/printnews.
asp?id=9138 (citing the New York Times).
62. See Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, Outsiders on the Bench: The Continuing
Struggle for Equality, 16 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 15, 16-17 (2001).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2006

13

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 2

40

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 14:1

constitutional equality issue,63 it is useful to consider the amount of
protection the federal constitutions provide for women because this
may influence how gender equality is viewed in non-constitutional law
areas such as the provocation defense. Neither the United States nor
Australian Constitutions expressly provide for equality of the sexes.
However, even though it includes no reference to sex equality, the
U.S. Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
Clause64 has been interpreted to require close scrutiny of cases in
which the government discriminates based on gender.65 Under the
U.S. Constitution, gender equality is formal.66 Thus, only when men
and women are not viewed as similarly situated is sex discrimination
permissible.67 Unlike either the United States or Canada, Australia’s
Constitution has neither an equal protection clause nor any other
provision that has been used to address gender inequality. As a result,
Australia has neither formal nor substantive constitutional gender
equality jurisprudence.68
Canada, under its 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms, treats
gender equality quite differently from Australia and the United

63. See CÔTÉ ET AL., supra note 33, at 1.2 (indicating that at least one set of
Canadian feminist commentators, on behalf of Canada’s National Association of
Women and the Law, has proposed that the provocation defense, as it now exists in
Canada, violates the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms sex equality
provision).
64. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (declaring that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
65. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 519 (1996).
66. See, e.g., KATHERINE BARTLETT ET AL., GENDER AND THE LAW: THEORY,
DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 117-18 (3d. Ed. 2002).
67. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 (1974). On at least one occasion,
Congress has stepped in to provide substantive equality concerning pregnancy when
the Supreme Court had insisted on formal equality.
See, e.g., Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(k) (current through P.L. 109-65
(excluding P.L. 109-59) approved Sept. 20, 2005) (legislation pending) (rejecting the
Supreme Court’s holding in General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), that
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy was not sex discrimination under Title VII);
see also Michael M. v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 476 (1981)
(allowing for gender distinctions in a statutory rape statute because women and men
bear different burdens in sexual intercourse and pregnancy).
68. See SURI RATNAPALA, AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: FOUNDATIONS AND
THEORY 274 (Trischa Baker ed., 2002); see also GRAYCAR & MORGAN, supra note 40, at
211 (concluding that lack of any federal constitutional gender equality doctrine and
stating that “[i]n Australia, because of the absence of a constitutional right to
‘equality’, it is not easy and probably not even possible to present an equality
argument to a court in the context of, say, a criminal prosecution of a doctor for
performing an abortion.”). The federal Sex Discrimination Act of 1984 provides the
primary protection against discrimination on the basis of sex. This Act has been
described as taking “a formal equality approach.” See GRAYCAR & MORGAN, supra note
40, at 28-29 (quoting the examination of deficiencies in formal equality or gender
neutral treatment from AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, FINAL REPORT 69, EQUALITY
BEFORE THE LAW: WOMEN’S EQUALITY, Part II 3.9 (1994).
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States.69 The Charter explicitly provides for sex equality free from
government discrimination.70 This has been interpreted to mean
substantive equality71 based on equal human dignity and full
membership in society.72 Retired Supreme Court Justice Claire
L’Heureux-Dubé describes Canada’s equality provision “as combining
the [United States Constitution’s] Equal Protection Clause . . . and an
equal rights amendment.”73 Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, who helped
shape Canada’s constitutional jurisprudence from a substantive
equality perspective, emphasizes how different Canada’s provision
demanding “equality without discrimination” is from the same-as-men
formulation that is the prevailing equality analysis in Australia and the
United States.74
Canada’s embrace of substantive equality and its high percentage of
female appellate judges led me originally to predict that Canada
would treat any issue where the victims are overwhelmingly female
and the perpetrators overwhelmingly male as meriting a substantive
equality analysis. If not, I at least expected that Canada’s law would be
more feminist and protective of women’s rights and interests than
Australia or the United States. Therefore, I expected that traditional
provocation doctrine, which so clearly favors male rage and jealousy
over other emotions, would have been found to be a form of gender
discrimination that needed to be either substantially revised or
abolished, especially since Canadian courts have held that the values
set out in the Charter should influence how statutes and the common
law are interpreted.75 However, this has not been the Canadian
69. See Constitution Act, 1982, 79 enacted as Schedule B, Canada Act 1982, ch.
11, § 15(1) (U.K.).
70. See id.
71. See Majury, supra note 54, at 305 (stating that: “equality writing accepts that
substantive equality is the operative model in Canadian law.”).
72. See Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, § 15(1) (declaring that “[e]very individual is
equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal
benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination
based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or
physical disability.”) (emphasis added); see also id. § 28 (stating, “[n]otwithstanding
anything in this Charter, the rights and freedoms referred to in it are guaranteed
equally to male and female persons.”).
73. L’Heureux-Dubé, supra note 62, at 20.
74. See id.
75. See Cloutier v. Langlois, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 158 at 184. The Canadian Supreme
Court stated:
Though the parties have not relied on the Charter, and have simply referred
to the common law sources in examining the scope of the power to search, I
feel that the courts should “apply and develop the principles of the common
law in a manner consistent with the fundamental values enshrined in the
Constitution.”
Id. (quoting Retail, Wholesale & Dep’t Store Union, Loc. 580 v. Dolphin Delivery,
Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. at 603); see also Dir. of Family and Children’s Servs. v. E.I.,
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experience with provocation law even though Charter-based
substantive equality arguments have been made.76 Instead, Canada,
much of Australia and the slim majority of American states that do not
apply the Model Penal Code’s extreme emotional disturbance test
that is even more solicitous of male rage and jealousy,77 have similar
traditional provocation rules.78
Notably, however, two Australian states have completely rejected
this traditional approach: Tasmania, where the provocation defense
was abolished in 2003,79 and Victoria, where the provocation defense
was abolished in November 2005.80 Both jurisdictions’ explanations
for abolition highlight the decisive impact that elimination of
statutorily imposed limits on judges’ sentencing discretion can have
on the retention of a provocation rule.
In the next three sections, I examine in detail how provocation is
treated in the United States, Canada and Australia. I conclude that
the preference for formal or substantive equality in a jurisdiction’s
constitutional jurisprudence seems to have no influence on its
provocation rules.
Instead, the differing amounts of judicial
sentencing discretion in each jurisdiction provide the greatest
influence on how fully substantive equality is incorporated into a
jurisdiction’s handling of the provocation defense. In particular, I
demonstrate that presence or absence of mandatory minimum
sentencing, especially regarding murder, has been highly influential
in shaping each country’s provocation rules.
IV. UNITED STATES PROVOCATION LAW
Because of the severe limitations on judicial discretion concerning
sentencing, the United States presents a bleak picture regarding
incorporating substantive equality into its provocation doctrine.81
[2005] YKSC 4, ¶ 47 (explaining that “statutory interpretation can and should be
done in a manner consistent with the fundamental values enshrined in the
Charter.”).
76. See CÔTÉ ET AL., supra note 33, at 1.2 (noting that the primary beneficiaries of
the expanded provocation defense in Canada have been men, sometimes allowing
them to “get away with murder”).
77. See LEE, supra note 18, at 34-39 (describing this male-biased code as allowing
mitigation whenever a defendant can show he is suffering from extreme emotional
distress at the time of the homicide). But see MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b)
(2004).
78. See Forell, supra note 23, at 608-09.
79. See Criminal Code Act, 1924, § 160 (Tas.) amended by Criminal Code
Amendment (Abolition of Defence of Provocation) Act, 2003 (Tas.) (removing § 160,
which contained the defense of provocation, from the Criminal Code).
80. See Crimes (Homicide) Act, 2005, No. 77/2005, § 3B (Austl.) (amending
Crimes Act, 1958).
81. But see United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (calling into question
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Currently, for violent crimes such as manslaughter and murder, all
fifty American states have some form of determinate sentencing, most
frequently mandatory minimum sentences and sentencing
guidelines.82 This often gives American trial judges substantially less
room to factor in circumstances using their own discretion than exists
in Australia or Canada. American juries (through more gradations in
crime such as manslaughter, degrees of murder, and, in certain cases,
application of the death penalty), prosecutors (through deciding what
crime to charge) and legislatures (through mandatory minimum
sentences, sentencing grids and sentencing guidelines),83 determine
the length of time a convicted murderer will serve instead of trial
judges.
Most American trial judges have little or no discretion to provide
for a suspended or short murder sentence.84 This may explain why
American legal commentators are highly critical of current
provocation rules, yet fail to urge that provocation be abolished
entirely.85 Abolition is too risky and punitive for battered women who
kill, and perhaps, even for homicides committed out of rage and
jealousy.
Nevertheless, questions remain concerning why two sets of
provocation rules that permit male-bias are so firmly entrenched in
the United States. Despite widespread criticism of these existing
the constitutionality of mandatory sentencing guidelines); State v. Barker, 692
N.W.2d 755, 761 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (demonstrating the way mandatory minimum
sentences and sentencing guidelines have been under sustained attack for years). It
was further noted that they finally appear vulnerable. Id.
82. See Ben Trachtenberg, State Sentencing Policy and New Prison Admissions,
38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 479, 487 (2005).
83. See, e.g., GA. CODE. ANN. § 17-10-6.1 (2005) (providing that “no portion of the
mandatory minimum sentence imposed shall be suspended, stayed, probated,
deferred, or withheld by the sentencing court.”). This statute, which includes murder
and felony murder, is known as Georgia’s “Seven Deadly Sins” statute. Id.; see also
OR. REV. STAT. § 137.700 (stating, “the court shall impose, and the person shall serve,
at least the entire term of imprisonment”). The statute provides for a minimum
sentence of three hundred months (twenty-five years) for murder and one hundred
and twenty months (ten years) for manslaughter. Id. However, there are certain
specific exceptions under OR. REV. STAT. § 137.712 (2003).
84. Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1467,
1476 n.28 (2001); see also Bill Bishop, Man Who Killed Former Lover Gets Life,
EUGENE REG. GUARD, Feb. 4, 2005, at C3 (demonstrating that a trial judge’s lack of
discretion can lead to desired outcomes). In this case, an Oregon man who brutally
killed his ex-girlfriend for breaking off her relationship with him received a
mandatory minimum twenty-five year term after he was convicted of murder by the
jury. Id.
85. See, e.g., LEE, supra note 18, at 217-25 (recommending gender switching as a
device to enable juries to recognize their own prejudices); Nourse, supra note 20, at
1395-97 (recommending that provocation not be allowed when the conduct was
lawful); see also Joshua Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?: Some
Reflections on a Difficult Subject, 86 MINN. L. REV. 959, 963 (2001-02)
(recommending modifications to the existing provocation doctrine).
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rules, traditional provocation,86 and the even more lenient Model
Penal Code’s (“MPC”) extreme emotional disturbance rules
(“EED”),87 are still available to men who kill women who seek to
exercise their autonomy through infidelity or leaving.88 Formal
equality allows the rare woman who kills for the same reasons as men
to rely on these rules, as well. Substantive equality is limited to
allowing other emotions besides rage and jealousy to be considered.
Particularly troubling for achieving meaningful substantive equality
for women is the widespread enactment of the MPC, first adopted by
the American Law Institute in 1962.89 The highly subjective EED
provision predates the dramatic switch from indeterminate judgebased sentencing to legislatively mandate determinate sentencing and
the social and legal revolution concerning the rights of women, both
of which occurred in the 1970s. The shift to mandatory sentencing
pushes in the direction of allowing the EED’s subjectivity in order that
more defendants can avoid the draconian sentences for murder. In
contrast, social norms and the goal of substantive gender equality
make the EED’s similar treatment of battered women who kill and
domestic homicides based on jealous rage seem unjust. The MPC
authors’ failure to factor in how EED impacts women is reflected in
the commentaries to the MPC, issued in 1980, which contain not a
hint of concern about its effect on homicides involving infidelity,
separation or domestic violence.90
In addition to determinate sentencing, there may be another
reason for American law’s extreme willingness to allow juries to
partially excuse men who kill out of jealousy and rage. Compared to
Australia or Canada, Americans have a greater distrust of government

86. See State v. Viera, 787 A.2d 256, 264 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (listing
the four elements of a typical non-MPC provocation rule: (1) the provocation must be
adequate; (2) the defendant must not have had time to cool off between the
provocation and the slaying; (3) the provocation must have actually impassioned the
defendant; and (4) the defendant must not have actually cooled off before the
slaying); see also LEE, supra note 18, at 25 (describing the elements of a modern
provocation defense as: “(1) the defendant was actually provoked into a heat of
passion, (2) the reasonable person in the defendant’s shoes would have been so
provoked, (3) the defendant did not cool off, and (4) the reasonable person in
defendant’s shoes would not have cooled off.”).
87. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1962) (requiring that the jury find
that the killer acted: “under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse.
The
reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint
of a person in the actor’s situation under the circumstances as he believes them to
be.”).
88. See Nourse, supra note 20, at 1349.
89. See LEE, supra note 18, at 33 (stating some form of this provision is in effect
in almost half the states).
90. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 cmts. at 44-65 (1980).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol14/iss1/2

18

Forrell: Gender Equality, Social Values and Provocaion Law in the United S

2006]

GENDER EQUALITY, SOCIAL VALUES

45

and value individual over group rights. As Paul Marcus and Vicki
Waye observe in an article comparing Australia’s and America’s
criminal justice systems, these different values have led to a much
stronger attachment in the United States to the jury system.91 They
note:
From independence, the American jury has been seen as a political
weapon. . . . [In contrast], [a]lthough the jury is also valued in
Australia by accused persons for peer empathy, it is not so highly
valued as an essential component of the democratic system. Except
for the most serious criminal cases, jury trials are rare.92

Similar distinctions can be drawn between Canada and the United
States.93
This stronger attachment to letting the jury decide the seriousness
of the crime might make it difficult for Americans to give up the
provocation defense altogether.
Even if mandatory minimum
sentencing eventually is rejected and, therefore, judges are allowed to
tailor sentences to make them longer or shorter than currently
permitted, the provocation defense may not disappear. Provocation is
a classic jury question, one where the jury is asked to determine what
the ordinary person would do under the circumstances. Abolishing
provocation would leave this decision solely to a judge’s discretion in
sentencing. Considering the sharp swing away from broad judicial
sentencing discretion, which was the norm up until the 1970s, to
highly restricted judicial discretion today, it is hard to imagine
American jurisdictions returning to unfettered judicial discretion
91. See Paul Marcus & Vicki Waye, Australia and the United States: Two Common
Criminal Justice Systems Uncommonly at Odds, 12 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 27, 96-97
(2004) (noting that while Australia and the United States both use the jury system,
the United States views the jury as guaranteeing transparency and accountability while
Australia does not view the jury as so fundamental to the democratic process); see also
NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 2, at 3.133.
The jury has traditionally been and remains the appropriate arbiter of
community values. To remove fundamental issues of culpability from the jury
and to pass them on to the sentencing judge undermines its role. In
addition, a jury finding of manslaughter enables the public to understand
why a seemingly lenient sentence has been proposed. It therefore aids
community understanding of the law.
Id.; VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 6, at 37-38 (explaining that, in
Australia, concern about loss of jury involvement was one of the more compelling
objections made to the abolition of provocation in Victoria because juries reflect
“community values and standards” which promotes “community confidence in the
justice system” and that abolition “would place too much power in the hands of
judges”). But see Criminal Code Amendment (Abolition of Defence of Provocation)
Bill 2003(No. 15): Parliamentary Debates Before the Tasmanian House of Assembly,
59-74 (Mar. 20, 2003) (Tas.) (failing to mention concern about the roles of juries and
judges in the discussion in Parliament before it unanimously abolished provocation).
92. See Marcus & Waye, supra note 91, at 97.
93. See generally Neil Vidmar, Pretrial Prejudice in Canada: A Comparative
Perspective on the Criminal Jury, 79 JUDICATURE 249 (1996).
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while also abolishing provocation.94
V. CANADIAN PROVOCATION LAW
Even though Canada’s constitutional jurisprudence embraces
substantive equality and its case law urges that non-constitutional
issues be determined “in a manner consistent with the fundamental
values enshrined in the Constitution,”95 the law of provocation has
remained distinctly traditional and masculine. Unlike Australia and
the United States, Canada has a single nationwide provocation
statute.96 Therefore, there is no room for experimentation with
different provocation rules in different provinces. The federal
statute’s language, includes both the term “heat of passion” and a “no
time to cool off” requirement.97 It has been interpreted much like
provocation law in the United States. In other words, it empathizes
with men who commit domestic homicides in the heat of passion.
It is important to note that in Canada, murder carries a mandatory
life sentence with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years for
first degree and after ten years for second degree.98 There is a fouryear mandatory minimum sentence for manslaughter using a
firearm99 and no minimum for other methods of killing.100 Thus,
like many American jurisdictions,101 the sentencing differences
94. See Trachtenberg, supra note 82, at 484.
95. Retail, Wholesale & Dep’t Store Union, Loc. 580 v. Dolphin Delivery, Ltd.,
[1986] 2 S.C.R. 573, 603.
96. Can. Crim. Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 232 (1985).
97. See id. The statute provides that:
(1) Culpable homicide that otherwise would be murder may be reduced to
manslaughter if the person who committed it did so in the heat of passion
caused by sudden provocation.
(2) A wrongful act or an insult that is of such a nature as to be sufficient to
deprive an ordinary person of the power of self-control is provocation for the
purposes of this section if the accused acted on it on the sudden and before
there was time for his passion to cool.
(3) For the purposes of this section, the questions (a) whether a particular
wrongful act or insult amounted to provocation, and (b) whether the accused
was deprived of the power of self-control by the provocation that he alleges
he received, are questions of fact, but no one shall be deemed to have given
provocation to another by doing anything that he had a legal right to do.
Id. (emphasis added).
98. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE CANADA, A CRIME VICTIM’S GUIDE TO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM, LIFE SENTENCES AND SECTION 745.6 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE (2003), http://
canada.justice.gc.ca/en/ps/voc/guide/sec_m.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2005); see
also Sheehy, supra note 48, at 530.
99. See Can. Crim. Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 236(a).
100. See id. at § 236(b).
101. See, e.g., Conn. Stat. Ann. §§ 53a-35a (2) (mandatory minimum of twenty-five
years for murder); §§ 53a-35a (4) (mandatory minimum of five years for first-degree
manslaughter with a firearm); §§ 53a-35a (5) (mandatory minimum of one year for
first-degree manslaughter without a firearm).
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As a
between manslaughter and murder are extreme.102
consequence, complete abolition of provocation would result in
lengthy murder sentences for both battered women who kill out of
fear and men who kill in the heat of passion who could otherwise,
through a manslaughter conviction, have a much shorter sentence,
subject to greater judicial discretion. Even feminist critics of Canada’s
provocation defense, such as the National Association of Women and
the Law, only recommend abolition of provocation if mandatory
minimum sentences for murder are also abolished.103
While it is understandable that, due to mandatory minimum
sentencing, abolition of provocation is currently unthinkable in
Canada, it is disturbing that the Canadian Supreme Court has
continued to excuse male rage and jealousy by retaining its expansive
reading of heat of passion to cover situations well beyond those called
for by the statute’s language. In 1941, the Canadian Supreme Court,
faced with a statute similar to the one that is in effect today, expanded
provocation to include a situation where a husband was told of his
wife’s infidelity and her desire to leave him.104 This expansion was in
line with how courts in other common law countries were then
treating the defense of provocation. More troubling is the postCharter, 1996 decision, R. v. Thibert.105 The Thibert facts closely
resemble those of the 1990 Australian High Court decision Stingel,
discussed in the next section.106 Both courts applied very similar
traditional versions of provocation law yet reached different
outcomes.107
In Thibert the defendant stalked his estranged wife and tried to

102. See Can. Crim. Code, R.S.C., ch. C 46, § 718.2(a)(ii) (1996) (embodying
feminist sentencing provisions by requiring courts, when sentencing, to consider
abuse of “the offender’s spouse or common-law partner or child” to be an aggravating
factor in domestic homicide cases).
103. See, e.g., CÔTÉ ET AL., supra note 33, at § 3; accord Gorman, supra note 50, at
479 (stating that “[i]f the mandatory sentence for murder did not exist, the defence
of provocation would disappear. The outdated thinking found in R. v. Thibert would
simply be reflected in sentencing.”).
104. See R. v. Krawchuk, [1941] D.L.R. 353, 358-59 (Can.).
105. [1996] S.C.R. 37 (Can.); see Trotter, supra note 50, at 671 (describing
Thibert as “a highly questionable claim of provocation in a spousal homicide case.”).
106. See infra notes 123-133 and accompanying text.
107. See Criminal Code Act, 1924, § 160 (Tas.) amended by Criminal Code
Amendment (Abolition of Defence of Provocation) Act, 2003 (Tas.) (embodying the
provocation statute current when Stingel was decided). The statute provided:
Any wrongful act or insult of such a nature as to be sufficient to deprive an
ordinary person of the power of self-control, and which, in fact, deprives the
offender of the power of self-control, is provocation, if the offender acts upon
it on the sudden, and before there has been time for his passion to cool.
Id.
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corner her in her workplace parking lot.108 When her boyfriend
intervened, saying, “Come on big fellow, shoot me,”109 the defendant
shot and killed the man.110 The Canadian Supreme Court required
that the ordinary person “be of the same age, and sex, and share with
the accused such other factors as would give the act or insult in
question a special significance.”111 Thus, the Thibert test is quite
subjective, allowing an unlimited number of individual factors to be
considered on the issue of how the ordinary person would
respond.112
The Thibert Court viewed marital status and gender as relevant
individual factors. It therefore stated that the standard was “an
ordinary person who was a married man, faced with the break-up of
his marriage.”113 The Court further observed, “there is no doubt that
the relationship of the wife of the accused with the deceased was the
dominating factor in the tragic killing.”114 Therefore, it held that the
murder conviction must be reversed because a provocation
instruction was required.115
Canada’s provocation statute did not mandate this outcome; its
ordinary person test’s language is strictly objective. In particular, it is
disturbing that the Court found the statutory language that says that
provocation cannot be based on something someone has a legal right
to do, did not mean what it said. Acknowledging that “the actions of
the deceased . . . were clearly not prohibited by law,” the Thibert
Court still held that, because the deceased’s actions could be found to
be insulting, the law might not approve of them, and therefore, the
jury could find the deceased had no “legal right” to insult the
defendant.116 However, as the dissent noted, “no one has either an
emotional or proprietary right or interest in a spouse that would
justify the loss of self-control that the [defendant] exhibited.”117
108. See Thibert, S.C.R. at 52.
109. See id. at 53.
110. See id.
111. See id. at 49.
112. See NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 2, at 3.121
(highlighting that unlike in Australia, “Canadian law does not require the
provocation to be sufficient to make the ordinary person act as the accused did—it is
sufficient that the loss of self control be caused by the provocation.”) (emphasis in the
original). The Commission also noted that Canada did not require proportionality
while Australia did. Id.
113. See Thibert, S.C.R. at 52.
114. See id. at 50.
115. See id. at 55-56.
116. See id. at 55.
117. See id. at 65 (McClung, J.A., dissenting); cf. Nourse, supra note 20, at 1394-97
(proposing that provocation only be available for “warranted excuse,” where law or
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The Thibert Court did not consider whether substantive equality
was satisfied when it held that provocation could be asserted in this
case of killing out of rage and jealousy.118 The disproportionate
impact of the provocation defense on men and women in the context
of heat of passion killings clearly indicates that the heat of passion
defense does not satisfy substantive equality. According to one
Canadian commentator, the Canadian Supreme Court in Thibert
“elevate[d] jealous husbands to a class or group with special
characteristics that must be considered when determining if murder
was a reasonable response to a deceased’s words.”119 Since this
decision, the Canadian Supreme Court has had opportunities to
modify its view that requires provocation be considered in cases of
rage and jealousy; it has not done so.120 Clearly, the Charter’s
substantive equality values have had no influence on Canada’s law of
provocation.
VI. AUSTRALIAN PROVOCATION LAW
Among the three countries, Australia is the trend-setter on the law
of provocation. Both in its national case law and in the statutes in a

social norms deem the conduct to be punishable).
118. See Hyland, supra note 50, at 164-65 (using Thibert to discuss formal and
substantive equality). Hyland argues that the majority attempted to balance equality
and individual responsibility but that the Thibert holding “seems to undermine the
very principles of equality and individual responsibility it seeks to uphold.” Id. at 168.
Hyland concludes:
The evidence points to Norman Thibert seeking to maintain an unequal
relationship of domination of his wife, a refusal on his part to recognize and
accept her freedom within the relationship, including the freedom to leave it
for another man. In other words, Thibert’s actions leading up to the murder
betray the democratic and universal ideal of gender equality, which provide
the social and cultural context within to assess his responsibility for Sherren’s
murder.
Id. at 169.
119. See Gorman, supra note 50, at 499.
120. See R. v. Stone, [1999] S.C.R. 290, 304 (Can.) (deciding a case where a man
stabbed his nagging wife forty-seven times); see also R. v. Parent, [2001] S.C.R. 761,
763 (Can.) (deciding a case where a man shot his wife six times during an argument).
The non-provocation treatment in Parent was criticized as avoiding the issue of
provocation when in fact it “was more authentically a case about the operation of the
partial defence of provocation in section 232 of the Criminal Code than about
intent.” Trotter, supra note 50, at 688 (emphasis in original). In contrast to the
disappointing response to feminist concerns about provocation, the Canadian
Supreme Court has responded to battered women and self-defense in a way that is
more consistent with its endorsement of substantive equality. See, e.g., R. v. Malott,
[1998] S.C.R. 123, 124 (Can.) (stating juries must assess the perceptions of a battered
woman who has killed her abuser in light of the history of her abuse when
determining if the woman’s actions were reasonable); R. v. LaVallee, [1990] S.C.R.
852, 854 (Can.) (permitting an appeal against a guilty verdict based on expert
testimony indicating that battered women can discern when their batterers intend
life-threatening violence through the cycle of violence).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2006

23

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 2

50

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 14:1

number of its states, Australian criminal law has been much less
supportive of traditional provocation doctrine and more willing to
incorporate substantive equality into the law of domestic homicide.
In Australia, as in the United States, each state provides its own
statutory or common-law definition of crimes and defenses. Until
recently, all Australian states provided a partial excuse for killing in
the heat of passion. However, Australian courts and legislatures have
become far less willing to excuse domestic homicides committed in
the heat of passion.
In 1995, Australia’s High Court held in Masciantonio v. R. that the
rules for provocation were uniformly traditional throughout
Australia.121 The High Court’s test requires the jury to decide
whether the victim’s provocation could cause an ordinary person to
lose self-control and kill.122 Under this test, one might expect that
men who commit domestic homicide out of rage or jealousy would be
quite successful in seeking to assert a provocation defense.
Surprisingly, the appellate case law suggests otherwise.
The most important High Court decision concerning provocation
in the context of domestic homicide is Stingel v. R, in which a young
man killed his former girlfriend’s current lover.123 The defendant in
Stingel stalked his former girlfriend and found her having sex with
her new boyfriend.124 When he told the defendant to “piss off you
cunt,” the defendant stabbed him to death.125 The facts of this case
were quite similar to those in the Canadian Supreme Court’s Thibert

121. (1995) 129 A.L.R. 575 (Austl.).
122. See id. The test for provocation is:
The provocation must be such that it is capable of causing an ordinary person
to lose self-control and to act in a way in which the accused did. The
provocation must actually cause the accused to lose-self-control and the
accused must act whilst deprived of self-control before he has had the
opportunity to regain his composure.
Id.; see also VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 12, at 23 (summarizing the
High Court’s test for provocation as requiring evidence: (1) of something accepted as
provocation; (2) that the accused lost self-control as a result of provocation; and (3)
that the provocation was capable of causing an ordinary person to lose self-control
and form an intent to inflict grievous bodily harm or death).
123. See (1990) 171 C.L.R. 312 (Austl.) (applying only to Queensland and Western
Australia, states that base provocation statutes on the Griffith Criminal Code enacted
in Queensland in 1899 and Western Australia in 1903); see also DESMOND O’CONNOR
& P.A. FAIRALL, CRIMINAL DEFENCES IN AUSTRALIA, PROVOCATION 202 (4th ed. 2005).
For more information on the Griffith Code, see generally The Honourable Sir Harry
Gibbs, The Queensland Criminal Code: From Italy to Zanzibar, July 19, 2002,
http://www.courts.qld.gov.au/library/exhibition/crimcode/20020719_Harry%20Gib
bs.pdf.
124. See Stingel, 171 C.L.R. at 317-18. Killing the male lover is another all too
common form of domestic homicide.
125. See id. at 319-20.
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case.126 However, unlike the Thibert Court, the Australian High
Court held that, as a matter of law, the ordinary person test was not
satisfied.127 Therefore, the Court in Stingel found that the trial
court’s refusal to give a provocation instruction was correct.128 The
Court concluded, “no jury, acting reasonably, could fail to be satisfied
beyond reasonable doubt that the [defendant’s] reaction to the
conduct of the deceased fell far below the minimum limits of the
range of powers of self-control which must be attributed to any
hypothetical ordinary nineteen-year-old.”129 This decision was based
on Tasmania’s then existing provocation statute,130 which the High
Court noted was similar to Canada’s federal provocation statute.131
The High Court set out a hybrid two-step test for provocation that
has been widely criticized in Australia as being too complex and hard
to follow.132 After factoring in any relevant personal characteristics of
the defendant in determining the gravity of the provocation, the only
attribute of the defendant that is to be considered in deciding
whether such provocation could cause an ordinary person to lose
control is the defendant’s age.133 Compared to provocation tests used
in the United States134 and Canada,135 Australia’s test is somewhat less
subjective because the accused’s gender and other personal
characteristics are not as fully factored in to how an ordinary person
would respond to the provocation.136 Applying this test, numerous
126. See supra notes 105-111 and accompanying text.
127. See Stingel, 171 C.L.R. at 336-37.
128. See id.
129. Id. at 337-38.
130. See Criminal Code Act, 1924, § 160 (repealed 2003) (stating that a jury could
find manslaughter if the accused caused death “in the heat of passion” caused by “any
wrongful act or insult of such a nature as to be sufficient to deprive an ordinary
person of self-control.”); see also Stingel, 171 C.L.R. at 320.
131. See Stingel, 171 C.L.R. at 320-21.
132. See VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 5, at 34-35.
133. See Stingel, 171 C.L.R. at 329.
134. See, e.g., People v. Berry, 556 P.2d 777, 780 (Cal. 1976) (measuring the
defendant’s reaction to his victim’s alleged provocation against that of “an ordinary
man of average disposition.”); accord People v. Lujan, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 769, 786
(Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
135. See, e.g., R. v. Thibert, [1996] D.L.R. (4th) 675, 683 (Can.) (summarizing
that the ordinary person test should consider the accused’s age, sex and “other
factors” in order to determine the reasonableness of the loss of self-control). But see
R. v. Hill, [1986] S.C.R. 313, 314 (Can.) (affirming that age and gender were the only
necessary factors to be considered for the ordinary person test in this gay panic case).
Hill is the basis for the test applied in Stingel; however, Australia limits the test to age
only, not gender. Id. See generally Morgan, supra note 2, at 258.
136. See Stingel, 171 C.L.R. at 331 (holding that the ordinary person test can
include the age of the accused and that other relevant qualifying attributes may be
considered when evaluating the gravity of the provocation); see also VICTORIAN LAW
REFORM COMM’N, supra note 5, at 25-26 (providing an example of how this test would
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Australian lower appellate courts have also upheld trial courts’ refusals
to give provocation instructions in cases involving male rage and
jealousy, including cases involving husbands killing their wives.137
Some of these cases openly acknowledge that the provocation defense
is gender-biased.138 Thus, it appears that Australian courts, when
faced with a traditional provocation rule, usually look unfavorably on
allowing provocation in cases of male rage and jealousy.139
There are exceptions, however. Recently, an Australian jury in
Victoria was instructed on and accepted a provocation claim by James
Ramage, who killed his wife Julie because she told him that she had
found someone else and that sex with Ramage repulsed her.140 The
jury verdict and the eleven-year sentence led to national outcry and
public debate over the appropriateness of the provocation defense.141
During this debate, the Victorian Law Reform Commission released

be applied). For example,
[I]f a [thirty-three]-year-old white man with a stutter killed his estranged wife
after she had made disparaging remarks about him and teased him about his
stutter, in determining the gravity of the provocation, the jury may consider
how an ordinary [thirty-three]-year-old white man with a stutter might have
viewed those comments. The jury would then have to consider how an
ordinary adult not sharing any of the accused’s characteristics, such as his
stutter or sex, might have reacted to provocation of that gravity.
Id.
137. See, e.g., Hart v. The Queen (2003) 139 A. Crim. R. 520, 545 (Austl.)
(affirming the trial court’s conclusion that the appellant husband failed to
demonstrate any issue of provocation when he killed his estranged wife after seeing
her kiss another man); R. v. Kumar (2002) 133 A. Crim. R. 245, ¶ 3 (Austl.)
(affirming the trial court’s withdrawal of provocation from the jury where a husband
killed his de facto wife after she insulted him); see also R. v. Leonboyer (2001)
V.S.C.A. 149, ¶ 72 (Austl.) (affirming the trial judge’s conclusion not to leave
provocation to the jury where a man killed his girlfriend after allegedly hearing of her
infidelity). But see R. v. Yasso (2004) V.S.C.A. 127, ¶¶ 48-50 (Austl.) (granting an
appeal against applicant husband’s murder conviction to allow the defense of
provocation to be open to the jury).
138. See Yasso, V.S.C.A. at ¶ 43 (acknowledging that it is justifiable to assert that
the provocation defense is “imbued with gender bias”); see also Morgan, supra note
2, at 255 (discussing gender bias in provocation cases).
139. See, e.g., R. v. Muy Ky Chhay (1994) 72 A. Crim. R. 1 (Austl.) (citing Stingel
and extending the provocation defense to battered women, even where the battered
woman killed her batterer while he was asleep).
140. See Victoria Considers Reform of Provocation Defense (ABC radio broadcast
Dec. 9, 2004), available at http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2004/s1261755.htm
(describing anger and political mobilization in Victoria due to the reduced sentence
given to James Ramage, who killed his estranged wife); see also R. v. Butay (2001)
V.S.C. 417, ¶ 2 (Austl.) (finding the husband guilty of manslaughter by way of
provocation because his wife taunted him about her affair); VICTORIAN LAW REFORM
COMM’N, supra note 12, at 280-81 (discussing Butay as part of a case study).
141. See Govt Abolishes Provocation Defence, THE AGE (Austl.), Jan. 20, 2005
[hereinafter Govt Abolishes] (noting that Julie Ramage’s death became a focal point
for reform with more than 3,500 letters sent to her family urging government action);
see also Ian Munro, The World’s Best Justice?, THE AGE (Austl.), Nov. 17, 2004, at A3,
4.
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its final report on defenses to homicide that included a
recommendation that the state parliament abolish provocation
entirely.142 In January 2005, the political leader of Victoria, Acting
Premier John Thwaites, promised to introduce legislation to abolish
the defense;143 in November 2005, the Victorian Parliament abolished
provocation.144 Previously, Tasmania was the first Australian state to
abolish the defense, in 2003.145
Australia is the only country in which any of its jurisdictions have
abolished provocation altogether.146 It is not a coincidence that
Victoria and Tasmania are two of the four Australian states that have
abolished mandatory minimum sentencing for murder.147 The ability
of trial judges to tailor murder sentences,148 along with concerns
about the provocation defense’s unfairness to women,149 were
142. See VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 12, at 20.
143. See Press Release, Office of Premier, Abolition of Provocation as a Defence to
Homicide (Jan. 21, 2005 Austl.) (on file with the American University Journal of
Gender, Social Policy & the Law).
144. See Crimes (Homicide) Act, 2005, No. 77/2005, § 3B (Austl.) (amending
Crimes Act, 1958).
145. See Criminal Code Act, 1924 (Tas.), amended by Criminal Code Amendment
(Abolition of Defence of Provocation) Act, 2003 (Tas.).
146. See Criminal Code Act, 1995 (Austl.) (demonstrating that the
Commonwealth of Australia does not have a provocation defense as part of its
criminal law). Because the Commonwealth has never had a provocation defense, it is
technically the first jurisdiction not to allow provocation. However, since homicide is
rarely prosecuted as a federal crime, the lack of a provocation defense has little
practical impact.
147. See Crimes Act, 1900 (N.S.W.) (containing no mandatory minimum sentence
for murder in New South Wales); Crimes Act, 1900, § 13 (Austl. Cap. Terr.)
(containing no mandatory minimum sentence for murder in the Australian Capital
Territory); VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 12, at 51 (discussing both
states’ modified provocation rules that make it easier for battered women to assert the
defense); see also infra notes 239-240 and accompanying text.
148. See VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 12, at 33 (asserting that
because judges can tailor sentences, provocation should be taken into account at
sentencing along with other mitigating factors instead of existing as an independent
defense). See generally Criminal Code Amendment (Abolition of Defence of
Provocation) Bill 2003(No. 15): Parliamentary Debates Before the Tasmanian House
of Assembly, 59-74 (Mar. 20, 2003) (Tas.).
149. See VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 12, at 27-28; see also Govt
Abolishes, supra note 141 (quoting Victoria’s Attorney-General Rob Hulls as saying:
“[p]rovocation is a hangover from a bygone era where women were actually treated as
chattels.”). The debate in the Tasmanian Parliament was more divided. The
Attorney General Judith Jackson, who introduced the bill to abolish provocation,
spoke explicitly about provocation being “gender biased and unjust.” See Criminal
Code Amendment (Abolition of Defence of Provocation) Bill 2003(No. 15):
Parliamentary Debates Before the Tasmanian House of Assembly, 60 (Mar. 20, 2003)
(Tas.). However, two of the three legislators who commented on the bill, Michael
Hodgman and Mr. McKim, while supporting it, expressly rejected gender-bias as a
reason for repeal. Id. Their responses were in terms of formal equality, arguing that
both women and men use the defense and are capable of similar violence. Id.
However, like the Victorian Law Reform Commission, the Model Criminal Code
Officers Committee of the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General cited gender
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influential in both states’ decisions. However, while both states have
justified abolition by focusing on judicial discretion in sentencing as a
substitute for the ameliorating effect of the provocation defense in
some intentional homicide cases, their approaches to abolition differ.
A. Victoria’s Approach
In addition to abolishing provocation, the Victorian Law Reform
Commission’s recommendations included reintroducing the partial
defense of excessive self-defense.150 It did this for the express
purpose of allowing those battered women who kill, but who are
unable to obtain an acquittal for self-defense because their response
to their fear was found unreasonable, to still be able to prove the
One reason for urging the
lesser crime of manslaughter.151
reintroduction of excessive self-defense was to influence battered
women who, under the then existing system, might choose to plead
guilty to manslaughter based on provocation out of concern that
going to trial on self-defense could result in a murder conviction.
The Commission believed that after the abolition of provocation such
women would more likely risk going to trial on self-defense, knowing
that a jury could find the back-up partial defense of excessive selfdefense.152 Thus, under the Commission’s proposal, manslaughter
bias as a major reason for its recommendation that the provocation defense be
abolished. See MODEL CRIMINAL CODE, OFFICERS COMM. OF THE STANDING COMM. OF
ATTORNEYS-GENERAL, DISCUSSION PAPER, MODEL CRIMINAL CODE, CH. 5, FATAL OFFENCES
AGAINST THE PERSON 103 (June 1998) [hereinafter MODEL CRIMINAL CODE].
150. See Zecevic v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecution (1987) 162 C.L.R. 645, ¶ 13 (Austl.)
(abandoning the excessive self-defense doctrine because the difficulty and risk of
error in applying it to the facts of a given case proved greater than any advantages of
its use).
151. See VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 12, at 269. Recently, a
simplified modern version of excessive self-defense was enacted in New South Wales
which provides:
(1) This section applies if: (a) the person uses force that involves the
infliction of death, and (b) the conduct is not a reasonable response in the
circumstances as he or she perceives them, but the person believes the
conduct is necessary: (c) to defend himself or herself or another person, or
(d) to prevent or terminate the unlawful deprivation of his or her liberty or
the liberty of another person.
(2) The person is not criminally responsible for murder but, on a trial for
murder, the person is to be found guilty of manslaughter if the person is
otherwise criminally responsible for manslaughter.
Crimes Act 1900, § 421 (N.S.W.). Excessive self-defense has an American analogue in
the partial defense of imperfect self-defense, which is allowed in a minority of
American jurisdictions. See, e.g., Laurie J. Taylor, Comment, Provoked Reason in
Men and Women: Heat-of-Passion Manslaughter and Imperfect Self-Defense, 33
UCLA L. REV. 1679, 1707-08 (1986).
152. See VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 12, at 102 (acknowledging
that this decision could backfire, and a jury that would otherwise have acquitted based
on self-defense, might opt for excessive self-defense instead, resulting in a
manslaughter conviction).
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would be available for fear, the emotion that motivates more women
who commit domestic homicide, but no longer allowed for rage and
jealousy, the emotions that motivate more men who commit domestic
homicide. As the Commission noted: “Excessive self-defence would
seem to better fit the circumstances of women who kill in this context
than . . . the existing partial defence of provocation . . . [because
t]here is no need, as for provocation, to establish that the accused
acted due to a ‘loss of self-control.'”153
The Victorian Parliament heeded the Commission’s advice, but
instead of reintroducing the partial excuse of excessive self-defense, it
enacted a new crime called “defensive homicide.”154 This crime has
no minimum sentence and provides a maximum sentence of twenty
years;155 the same penalty that applied to the manslaughter based on
provocation before it was abolished.156 Defensive homicide is
committed when a person kills another while believing the conduct
was necessary to defend herself or another from death or “really
serious injury” where she did not have reasonable grounds for this
belief.157 This new crime was enacted to address family violence
situations where the defendant killed out of fear but is unable to meet
the reasonableness requirement for self-defense.158 As Attorney
153. See id.
154. See Crimes (Homicide) Act, 2005, No. 77/2005, §§ 4, 9AD (Austl.)
(amending Crimes Act, 1958).
[Defensive homicide is] similar in some ways to the common-law rule of
‘excessive self-defence’ that existed prior to 1987 but was abolished by the
High Court’s decision in Zecevic’s case.
Under the earlier common-law rule of excessive self-defence, and the
provisions of other jurisdictions, a person who has a genuine belief that his or
her conduct is necessary in self-defence, but who is not considered to have
acted reasonably is guilty of the lesser offence of manslaughter. However,
there could be confusion about the basis of the jury’s verdict, as there were
several potentially inconsistent ways that a jury could reach a manslaughter
verdict. The new offence of defensive homicide will clearly indicate the basis
of the jury’s verdict to the sentencing judge. This will enable the sentencing
judge to impose a sentence that accurately reflects the crime that the person
committed.
Crimes (Homicide) Bill: Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Before the Victorian
Legislative Assembly, 55th Parliament, 1789 (Oct. 27, 2005) (Vic.) (statement of
Honourable J.M. Madden, Minister for Sport and Recreation).
155. See Crimes (Homicide) Act at § 9AD.
156. See VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 12, at 274.
157. See Crimes (Homicide) Act at §§ 9AC, 9AD.
158. Most commentators describe provocation as a partial excuse because the actor
is not entirely to blame for what happened: He either could not control his desire to
kill, or demanding such control would be unfair in light of the provocation. A few
commentators describe provocation as a partial justification because the adequately
provoked killer’s conduct has committed a lesser crime than one who intentionally
kills without provocation. See Stephen P. Garvey, Passion’s Puzzle, 90 Iowa L. Rev.
1677, 1680-82, 1693-00 (2005); see also LEE, supra note 18, at 227-30. The new crime
of defensive homicide is a lesser crime than murder that appears to be a partial
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General Rob Hulls noted in his discussion of this crime before the
Legislative Assembly: “This is a reform that is aimed at removing
entrenched bias and misogynist assumptions from the law to make
sure that women who kill while genuinely believing it is the only way
to protect themselves or their children are not condemned as
murderers.”159
The Victorian Parliament’s abolition of provocation and enactment
of the new offense of defensive homicide are clear examples of
lawmakers choosing to substitute substantive for formal gender
equality.160 As a result, the punishment for defensive homicide will
be similar to what was available through provocation to battered
women who kill but are unable to prove they acted in self-defense.
However, punishment for people who kill out of anger and
possessiveness may be substantially greater under a murder conviction
than it was when provocation made the lesser crime of manslaughter
available to them. Victoria’s new laws provide an opportunity to
determine whether expressly feminist legislation that seeks to provide
substantive equality, in practice changes how men and women who
kill out of jealousy and anger, or fear and despair, are treated by a
common law criminal justice system.
B. Tasmania’s Approach
The Tasmanian approach to abolishing provocation differed
substantially from that of Victoria. While there had been cases161 and
justification because the killing, though unreasonable, was committed for the morally
defensible motive of fear.
159. Crimes (Homicide) Bill: Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Before the
Victorian Legislative Assembly, 55th Parliament, 1844 (Oct. 26, 2005) (Vic.)
(statement of Honourable R.J. Hulls, Attorney General, Minister for Industrial
Relations and Minister for Planning). Other provisions of the Crimes (Homicide)
Bill also were adopted with family violence in mind: First, self defense was codified in
§ 9AC and a special provision, § 9AH(1) provides rules concerning lack of immediacy
and excessive force that apply solely where family violence is alleged. Second, §
9AH(2)-(4) expressly describes certain kinds of evidence that may be introduced in
domestic homicide cases. See Crimes (Homicide) Act at §§ 9AC, 9AH(1)-(4).
160. See VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 12, at 15 (providing a
substantive equality rationale for its recommendations). The Commission noted:
Defences and/or partial defences to homicide should not be based on
abstract philosophical principles, but should reflect the context in which
homicides typically occur. In particular, the law should deal fairly with both
men and women who kill and defences should be constructed in a way that
take account of the fact they tend to kill in different circumstances.
Id.
161. See, e.g., Hutton v. The Queen, (1986) 20 A. Crim. R. 315 (Austl.)
(expanding the scope of provocation in cases involving male rage and jealousy)
discussed in detail infra, notes 209-213, and accompanying text; see also R. v. Franke
(Aug. 22, 1984) 2 (Tas.) (on file with the American University Journal of Gender,
Social Policy & the Law) (convicting a battered woman of manslaughter). In this
case, preceding Hutton, the defendant was being sexually assaulted by her husband
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demonstrating
that
Tasmania’s
traditional
commentary162
provocation rule could produce distressingly male-biased results,163
there was no law reform report or specific case that provided either a
feminist or other impetus for eliminating the defense of provocation.
Furthermore, unlike the Victorian Law Reform Commission,
Tasmanian Attorney General Judith Jackson’s proposal to abolish
provocation was unaccompanied by any other recommendations.164
Instead, Jackson, as a Member of Parliament for the majority Labor
Party, simply brought her proposal to abolish provocation to
Parliament for their consideration.165 She asserted that abolition
would not “in any way” be detrimental to battered women.166 After a
lively discussion, the Tasmania Parliament voted unanimously to
abolish provocation.167
Tasmania’s abolition of provocation appears to be a positive step on
behalf of women. The shift in power from the jury to the judge
assumes that judges, through sentencing discretion, will be more
likely to punish severely those murderers who kill out of rage and
jealousy while providing only light sentences when murderers are
battered women who kill out of fear. It remains to be seen whether
this assumption proves correct. Especially uncertain is how battered
women, who would have previously relied on provocation, will fare
without this defense. Will the lack of either this backup partial
defense, or a substitute such as the defensive homicide crime enacted
in Victoria, cause more battered women to go to trial on complete
self-defense because the only option for a plea is murder?168 Will
with the handle of a claw hammer when she seized it, struck and killed him, and then
disposed of the body. Id. at 3. The decedent was reported to have been cruel to
defendant and their children. Id. The Court accepted that defendant “lost the
power of self-control and caused her husband’s death in the heat of sudden
provocation.” Id.; see also Bradfield, supra note 30, at 15. The defendant was
sentenced to three years imprisonment. KATE WARNER, SENTENCING IN TASMANIA 275,
n.43 (2d ed. 2002).
162. See, e.g., Bradfield, supra note 30, at 5-7.
163. On the other hand, Tasmania was the jurisdiction out of which Stingel arose.
The trial judge and Tasmanian appellate court both held that a provocation
instruction should not have been allowed. See Stanley M. H. Yeo, Power of SelfControl in Provocation and Automatism, 14 SYDNEY L. REV. 3, 3 (1992).
164. See Criminal Code Amendment (Abolition of Defence of Provocation) Bill
2003(No. 15): Parliamentary Debates Before the Tasmanian House of Assembly, 5974 (Mar. 20, 2003) (Tas.) (indicating that the Attorney General had the support of
the Tasmanian Director of Public Prosecutions, Mr. Ellis, in his 2000-01 report where
he questioned retaining provocation).
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. Diminished responsibility, another partial defense that is often used to reduce
murder to manslaughter in the domestic homicide context, is not available in either
Tasmania or Victoria. See VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 12.
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juries convict them of murder or, instead, be more inclined than
when provocation was a middle ground, to acquit them based on
complete self-defense?169 Because Tasmania has so few homicides,
these concerns are unlikely to be resolved for some time.170
Two effects of Victoria’s and Tasmania’s abolition of provocation
are clear. Juries no longer have a say in the assessment of culpability
among those killers committing intentional homicide based on heat
of passion. Furthermore, killers who previously would not have been
labeled murderers will now bear that label. The difference, however,
between the two states is that in Tasmania both heat of passion and
fear-based domestic homicides will be treated as murder while
Victoria will allow juries to find a lesser crime for the fear-based
homicides.
In a few years time a comparison can be made between the
domestic homicide decisions and sentencing in Victoria and
Tasmania and also between their outcomes and those in jurisdictions
that retain the provocation defense. It may then be possible to
determine whether Victoria’s lesser crime of defensive homicide is
beneficial for battered women and therefore whether it is important
of provide such an alternative to murder instead of simply, as in
Tasmania, abolishing provocation. Whether it is beneficial will
depend on what prosecutors and juries do. Will Victorian prosecutors
and juries simply substitute defensive homicide for provocation, and
therefore, routinely find this lesser crime or will they more frequently
opt for acquittal based on complete self-defense?171 Will prosecutors
and juries in Tasmania more frequently opt for murder or complete
self-defense for battered women who kill? In time, it should also
become apparent in both states whether judges are sentencing men
who murder in the heat of passion more severely than was the case for
similarly situated men who were previously convicted of
manslaughter.172
The abolition of provocation is unlikely to sweep Australia. The
critical reason is that while no Australian state has a mandatory
169. See Rebecca Bradfield, The Demise of Provocation in Tasmania, 27 CRIM. L.J.
322, 324 (2003).
170. According to the author’s review of all of Tasmania’s domestic homicide cases
and sentences between June 1, 2003 and March 31, 2005, Tasmania has very few
homicide cases each year. Since provocation was abolished, there have been no
convictions or sentences involving domestic homicide as of March 2005.
171. See VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 12, at 103-04
(recommending that if excessive self-defense is enacted, then in five years the
Victorian Department of Justice should review the interaction of the defense with
complete self-defense and with plea and trial practices to make sure it is having the
desired effect).
172. See Bradfield, supra note 169, at 324.
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minimum sentence for manslaughter, unlike Victoria and Tasmania,
some Australian states have mandatory minimum sentences for
murder.173 Abolishing provocation leaves only the options of
acquittal or murder unless some other basis for manslaughter such as
excessive self-defense or a lesser crime such as defensive homicide is
created. The mandatory sentencing requirement for murder then
prevents judges from tailoring murder sentences to take into account
circumstances surrounding the killing, such as whether there was any
violent provocation or merely an attempt to exercise sexual autonomy
or leave the relationship.
VII. CHANGING SOCIAL NORMS
Even though the criminal law doctrine differs, sometimes
dramatically, social norms appear to be affecting the outcomes in
domestic homicide cases involving heat of passion and fear in all
three countries. For example, while substantive equality has had little
influence on the statutes and appellate case law in Canada concerning
the heat of passion basis for provocation, its impact on sentencing in
Canadian cases indicates that excusing men who kill in a jealous rage
has become less socially acceptable. Once a jury finds provocation,
Canada only minimally restricts sentencing discretion174 and
therefore judges can factor in the circumstances surrounding the
killing in deciding the appropriate punishment to impose. Currently,
Canadian judges appear to be sentencing men who kill out of rage
and jealousy quite differently than they sentence battered women who
kill. In a recent Canadian case study, men who successfully used
provocation in plea-bargaining or at trial were sentenced to six to
twelve years, with no man receiving less than two years.175 In contrast,
most of the women who successfully used provocation received
sentences ranging from two years to suspended sentences; the longest
sentence for any woman was five years.176 Thus, because of the
flexibility of sentencing for manslaughter in Canada, judges are
tailoring the punishment in provocation cases to fit the crime.
There have been similar sentencing outcomes in provocation cases
in Australia.177 One Australian study found that the average sentence
173. See, e.g., Criminal Code, 1899, § 305 (Queensl.); Criminal Code Act
Compilation Act, 1913, § 282 (W. Austl.).
174. See supra notes 98-103, and accompanying text.
175. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE CANADA, REPORT ON SENTENCING FOR MANSLAUGHTER
CASES INVOLVING INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS (2003), http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/
dept/pub/smir/ms_ int_rel_report_lawrev.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2005).
176. See id.
177. See VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 12, at 275-83. The
Commission also noted, “juries in recent years may have become more reluctant to
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length for women guilty of manslaughter was three to five years.178 In
contrast, the average length for men guilty of manslaughter was six to
eight years.179 The study also found that thirty-three percent of the
women received non-custodial sentences, compared with ten percent
of the men.180 The likely reason for the different sentences for men
and women is that existing provocation rules are at odds with the
social norms concerning both killing out of possessiveness and anger
and killing out of fear and despair. Further evidence that provocation
rules do not represent current values is provided by Rebecca
Bradfield’s study, discussed earlier, where battered women were
highly successful in their use of provocation while men who killed in
the heat of passion were much more likely to be found guilty of
murder.181
Substantive equality may be making inroads in the United States as
well.
Because of the evolution of social norms concerning
appropriate responses to sexual jealousy, I suspect that juries, and
prosecutors through plea-bargaining, are today more likely to opt for
murder over manslaughter for rage-based domestic killings than in
the past.182 A recent study of extreme emotional disturbance (EED)
pleas and verdicts in New York City by Kirschner, Litwack and
Galperin, provides intriguing evidence supporting this suspicion.183
This study looked at all cases where defendants pleaded EED to
“charges of intentional murder or attempted intentional murder in
New York County over a [ten]-year period (1988-1997).”184 The
authors’ “major finding” was “that jurors, judges, and prosecutors
were much more likely to accept a defense of EED when the
defendant’s homicidal behavior was motivated significantly by an
understandable fear . . . than when the defendant acted out of anger
without fear of physical harm.”185
The sample in the study was small, consisting of twenty-four cases
where defendants argued EED in murder.186 Nine defendants were
accept the partial defence of provocation. The discretion of the trial judge not to
leave provocation for the jury’s consideration has also been relied upon in a number
of recent Victorian cases.” Id. at 41.
178. See NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 2, at 3.99.
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
182. See LEE, supra note 18, at 66.
183. Stuart M. Kirschner et al., The Defense of Extreme Emotional Disturbance, 10
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 102 (2004).
184. See id. at 102.
185. See id.
186. See id. at 108
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found guilty of, or pled guilty to, manslaughter; fifteen were found
guilty of, or pled guilty to, murder.187 Only two of the twenty-four
were female; they both pled guilty to manslaughter in cases where the
dominating emotion was fear rather than anger.188 Only one of the
nine manslaughter outcomes involved a man committing a domestic
homicide.189 In contrast, ten of the fifteen cases where the outcome
was murder involved men committing domestic homicides where the
dominating emotion was anger.190 Overall, the authors noted that
“[i]n no case in our sample was pure rage viewed as reasonable.”191
The authors noted that the concern that EED allowed cases of
killing out of possessiveness and rage to reach the jury was justified.192
However, based on their findings, they suggested, “the problems [that
commentators] perceive with the EED defense may be problems in
theory rather than in practice.”193 They also noted that New York
appellate decisions have upheld jury or judicial verdicts rejecting EED
in heat of passion domestic homicide cases.194 Finally, they pointed
out that New York appellate courts have also upheld trial judges’
refusals to allow a jury to consider EED in such domestic homicide
cases.195
Further empirical research is needed to determine whether these
findings from one county in New York are representative of how
prosecutors, juries and judges are applying the provocation defense
and EED in United States’ jurisdictions. Considering the changes in
recent years in the acceptability of jealous rage compared to fear as
bases for a manslaughter outcome,196 however, it seems likely that
these findings are representative. In particular, since the EED
defense is more sympathetic to defendants than traditional
provocation, one would expect similar pro-fear and anti-jealousy
results when a provocation defense was used. If this turns out to be
correct, it will mean that while juries are still being allowed to find
manslaughter in domestic homicide cases based on rage and those
based on fear, the latter emotion is much more likely to lead to a
manslaughter verdict. Thus, substantive gender equality may be
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

See id. at 110.
See id. at 109, 116-17; see also supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
See Kirschner et al., supra note 183, at 116-17.
See id.
See id. at 127.
See id. at 125-26.
See id. at 126.
See id.
See id.
See LEE, supra note 18, at 66.
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occurring in practice even though it does not appear to be in theory.
However, so long as determinate sentencing continues to be the norm
in the United States, any attempt at substantive equality will be a blunt
instrument. Fear-based killings may more likely result in a substantial
sentence for manslaughter (when acquittal based on self-defense is
the fairer outcome), while killings out of possessiveness may more
likely result in a much longer sentence for murder.
Another indicia of changing social norms include public outcry
concerning publicized cases where killing in the heat of passion
results in a manslaughter verdict. For example, the Ramage case,
discussed earlier,197 galvanized Victoria’s political leadership to seek
to abolish provocation.198 In Canada, there also has been adverse
public reaction to several high profile cases where men who
committed domestic homicide out of jealousy and rage were able to
rely on the provocation defense.199 Perhaps the most famous
American case in recent years that led to public outcry about men
who kill in the heat of passion were the murders of OJ Simpson’s exwife and her male friend. Even though Simpson was acquitted
because the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he
was the killer (but later found him civilly liable for both victims’
wrongful deaths), the evidence presented as to motive provided a
classic example of provocation of a violent, jealous and possessive
man.200
The recent negative public responses to, and harsher sentencing of
men who kill in the heat of passion, is based on a significant shift in
values over the past half-century. In the mid-twentieth century, the
197. See supra notes 140-145 and accompanying text.
198. See Crimes (Homicide) Bill: Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Before the
Victorian Legislative Council, 55th Parliament, 1924 (Nov. 15, 2005) (Vic.)
(statement of Ms. Jenny Mikakos, Member of Victoria’s Legislative Council). Ms.
Mikakos noted:
I was very touched by the fact that Jane Ashton also participated in those
discussions. Members might be aware that Jane Ashton is the twin sister of
Julie Ramage, who was murdered by her husband, James Rampage, after she
allegedly told him that their marriage was over. Jane Ashton has been a very
keen advocate for these reforms and has publicly welcomed the legislation
and the changes the government is seeking to pass through the Parliament
today.
Id.
199. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE CANADA, CONSULTATIONS, REFORMING CRIMINAL CODE
DEFENCES, PROVOCATION, SELF-DEFENCE AND DEFENCE OF PROPERTY, SECTION ONE:
BACKGROUND AND CRITICISM, THE PROVOCATION DEFENSE, http://canada.justice.gc.ca/
en/cons/rccd/section1p1.html (Sept. 29, 2005) (citing R. v. Stone, [1999] S.C.R. 290
(Can.), R. v. Thibert, [1996] S.C.R. 37 (Can.) and R. v. Klassen, [1997] W.C.B 210
(Can.), as recent cases stirring “considerable public concern that the alleged
provocation was inadequate to justify reducing the charge.”) (on file with the
American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law).
200. See FORELL & MATTHEWS, supra note 5, at xx.
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law of provocation in Australia, Canada and the United States,
became substantially more subjective and individualized,201 thereby,
making the defense available to more killers by allowing juries to
consider various aspects of their “human frailty.”202 The killers in the
1940s through 1980s for whom the broader subjective definition of
provocation was created were overwhelmingly male.
Language in the 1963 Australia High Court opinion in Parker v.
R203 demonstrates the use of changing values rationale for such
expansion. The wife of the defendant Parker had left him for another
man, Dan Kelly.204 Parker’s wife and Kelly had departed together and
were traveling on a public street when Parker, who pursued them,
seriously injured his wife and killed Kelly.205 Relying on the
defendant’s “human frailty” Chief Justice Dixon noted:
We are not living in the conditions of the sixteenth, seventeenth or
eighteenth century. According to the standards governing our
society in the later nineteenth century and the twentieth century
the succession of events and the conduct of Dan Kelly brought a
very strong provocation to an emotional nature, a provocation still
in actual operation when Parker came upon Dan Kelly with his
wife.206

Chief Justice Dixon ended up in the dissent in the High Court’s
decision in Parker; however, his view was vindicated when this case
was reversed on appeal to the Privy Council.207 Throughout the
1960s through the 1980s, a number of Australian commentators
advocated that the law of provocation become more subjective, taking
into account the emotional equation of the individual killer who
killed in the heat of passion. As Stanley Yeo noted in an article
published in 1987, “judges, reform commissioners and academic
commentators alike have called for [elimination of the objective test]
and replacement by a purely subjective test.”208

201. But see Bedder v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, (1954) 2 All ER 801 (H.L. U.K.)
(presenting one high-water mark case where the test for provocation was said to be
purely objective).
202. See VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 12, at 23-24 (indicating that
acceptance of emotions other than jealousy and rage is a recent development).
203. (1963) 111 C.L.R. 610, rev’d by Parker v. R., (1964) A.C. 1369 (Austl.).
204. See id. at 619 (Dixon, C.J. dissenting).
205. See id. at 619-20 (Dixon, C.J. dissenting).
206. See id. at 628-29 (Dixon, C.J. dissenting) (quoting from William
Shakespeare’s “Othello,” that “passion having (his) best judgment collied assayed to
lead the way.”).
207. See Parker v. R., (1964) A.C. 1369 (Austl.).
208. Stanley M.H. Yeo, Ethnicity and the Objective Test in Provocation, 16 MELB.
U. L. REV. 67, 67 (1987-88) (providing citations to a number of such authorities); see
MODEL CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 149, at 83.
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There are clear indications that some lawmakers are currently
responding to a different social climate that is more sensitive to
gender inequalities and less tolerant of the emotions of possessive
rage and jealousy. The dramatically different view and corresponding
legal treatment of provocation in Australia today, compared to twenty
to fifty years ago, demonstrates this point.
In Tasmania, as recently as 1986, the highest state appellate court
reversed the decision by the trial court, which had refused to allow the
defendant to argue provocation.209 The defendant had shot and
killed the woman he had been living with, who was married to
another man at the time, and her new lover in a sudden rage.210 In
its unanimous reversal, the court substantially broadened its
interpretation of the statutory language, “wrongful act or insult,”211 to
allow the defendant’s former lover’s “scornful laugh” to provide
sufficient insult to require consideration of provocation in both
homicide cases.212 In defending this expansion, the court explained,
“changing community values may render conduct not considered
sufficient to raise the defence in one age sufficient in another to
deprive an ordinary person of the power of self-control.”213
Seventeen years after this decision, the Tasmanian Parliament
unanimously abolished provocation.214 Attorney General Judith
Jackson (a member of the majority Labor Party) explained that “[t]he
law has changed and society has changed. An outdated and
inappropriate defence for murder should not be retained in the
twenty-first century.”215 The leaders of the minority Liberal and
Green parties also voiced their support for the abolition of
provocation.216 These leaders expressly noted that their support was
based how society had changed and argued that provocation’s
“concession to human frailty” was neither a necessity nor “consistent

209. See Hutton v. The Queen (1986) 20 A. Crim. R. 315, 331 (Austl.).
210. See id.
211. See id.; see also Criminal Code Act, 1924 (Tas.), amended by Criminal Code
Amendment (Abolition of Defence of Provocation) Act, 2003 (Tas.).
212. See Hutton, 20 A. Crim. R. at 318.
213. See id. at 321.
214. See supra notes 161-167 and accompanying text.
215. Criminal Code Amendment (Abolition of Defence of Provocation) Bill
2003(No. 15): Parliamentary Debates Before the Tasmanian House of Assembly, 60
(Mar. 20, 2003) (Tas.). She gave the following reasons for abolition: (1) provocation
can be factored into sentencing since a mandatory life sentence for murder no longer
exists; (2) the defense is outdated and not in keeping with social change; and (3) the
defense is gender-biased. See id.; see also Bradfield, supra note 169, at 323.
216. See Criminal Code Amendment (Abolition of Defence of Provocation) Bill
2003(No. 15): Parliamentary Debates Before the Tasmanian House of Assembly, 5974 (Mar. 20, 2003) (Tas.).
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with the expectations of a civilised society” especially in light of
Tasmania’s abolition of a mandatory life sentence for murder.217
What had happened between 1986 and 2003 that led lawmakers to
go from expanding the application of provocation to abolition? One
major change during this time has been the growing awareness and
understanding by lawmakers and the public about gender inequality
and domestic violence. The other was the abolition of the mandatory
life sentence for murder.
The recent Victorian Law Reform Commission’s report combined
with the adverse public and political reaction to the Ramage case is
further evidence of how domestic homicide in the heat of passion is
no longer viewed as deserving of compassion and empathy in
Australia. The Commission’s Report, in urging that provocation be
abolished, emphasized the changed values of the twenty-first century:
Historically, an angry response to a provocation might have been
excusable, but in the [twenty-first] century, the Victorian
community has a right to expect people will control their
behaviour, even when angry or emotionally upset—particularly
when the consequences are as serious as homicide.218

It also emphasized that the provocation defense is gender-biased:
[P]rovocation is most often raised by men in the context of a
relationship of sexual intimacy in circumstances involving jealousy
or an apparent desire to retain control. The continued existence or
availability of provocation in these circumstances may therefore be
seen as sending an unacceptable message—that men’s anger and
use of violence against women is legitimate and excusable. Some
people have questioned ‘how, in a supposedly “civilised” society,
can the desire to leave a relationship constitute behaviour which
would provoke anyone to kill?’219

The political leaders of Victoria agreed with the Commission’s views
on both changed social norms and gender bias. Attorney-General
Rob Hulls stated, “the justice system had to be brought up to date
with modern community values.”220 He also noted, “[p]rovocation is
a hangover from a bygone era where women were actually treated as
chattels.”221 The Acting Premier John Thwaites echoed the Attorney217. Id. at 61 (statement of Michael Hodgman, member of the Liberal Party)
(quoting Mr. Ellis, the Director of Public Prosecutions, from his annual report in
2000-01); accord id. (statement of Franklin McKim, member of the Green Party).
218. See VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 12, at xxi; see also MODEL
CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 149, at 103 (recommending that provocation be abolished
and noting that “[i]t cannot be escaped that this issue must . . . be decided by
reference to society’s values.”).
219. See VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 12, at 30 (footnotes omitted).
220. See Govt Abolishes, supra note 141.
221. See id.
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General, noting that “the law of provocation was an anachronism that
no longer had a place in modern, civilised society.”222 He added that
the “provocation defence was gender-biased and it promoted a blamethe-victim culture.”223 The Age, the leading newspaper in Victoria, in
an editorial, also agreed that social norms no longer can tolerate the
defense of provocation, describing it as “archaic” and urging it be
“abandoned.”224 The editorial noted, “we no longer live in a time
when ‘hot-blooded’ male violence is considered acceptable.”225 It
concluded that “the law should reflect a society’s values” and,
therefore, “[c]hange in this area is long overdue.”226
The Parliamentary debate in Victoria over abolishing provocation
also frequently referred to changing social values. One legislator,
after referring to the Ramage case, noted that abolition “is essential in
bringing our laws into line with community thinking and
standards.”227 Another legislator said that abolition was “yet another
step forward in the removal of that old-fashioned view that women
were property and therefore men could do with women what they
wished.”228 Yet another commented that “[t]he law surrounding
defences to homicide have not kept up with the pace of social change
and changes to social values.”229
As the studies of sentencing, plea-bargaining and jury verdicts
indicate, the change in social values in Tasmania and Victoria has also
occurred in other Australian states, and in Canada and the United
States. Yet abolition of provocation has occurred in two Australian
states without a mandatory life sentence for murder but not in any
state that does impose such a sentence. This suggests that the will to
incorporate substantive equality into the criminal law surrounding
domestic homicide exists, but not at the price of increasing the risk of
a life sentence for murder for either women who kill out of fear or,
perhaps, even for men who kill out of anger and jealousy. Because of
the lack of mandatory minimum sentences for manslaughter in other
222. See id.
223. See id.
224. See Time to Abolish the Provocation Defense, THE AGE (Austl.), Oct. 30,
2004, at 10.
225. See id.
226. See id.
227. Crimes (Homicide) Bill: Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Before the
Victorian Legislative Council, 55th Parliament, 1839 (Oct. 26, 2005) (Vic.) (statement
of Ms. Maxine Morand, Member of Victoria’s Legislative Assembly).
228. Id. at 1841 (statement of Ms. Louise Asher).
229. Crimes (Homicide) Bill: Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Before the
Victorian Legislative Council, 55th Parliament, 1923 (Nov. 27, 2005) (Vic.)
(statement of Ms. Jenny Mikakos, Member of Victoria’s Legislative Council Privileges
Committee).
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Australian states and only modest minimum manslaughter sentences
in Canada, trial judges have been able to incorporate these social
values and the resulting substantive equality into the sentencing
discretion that judges have once provocation has been found. In the
United States, which provides a greater variety of determinate
sentencing for both murder and manslaughter, there is less ability to
provide women who kill out of fear, but fail to prove self-defense, to
be given a non-custodial or very short sentence. Therefore, the values
favoring people who kill out of fear and disfavoring people who kill
out of anger and possessiveness may mainly be reflected in jury
verdicts and plea bargains.230
VIII. IS ABOLITION OF PROVOCATION NECESSARY?
There is much to be said for allowing juries to decide the
provocation issue rather than leaving it solely to judges through
sentencing discretion as has been done in Tasmania through its
abolition of provocation. There is even reason for concern when the
only emotion to be considered in allowing a lesser offence to be
decided by a jury is fear, as has been done in Victoria. Professor
Cynthia Lee in her book, Murder and the Reasonable Man: Passion
and Fear in the Criminal Courtroom, provides a number of reasons
why juries should still be allowed to find provocation.231 Most
convincing is her claim concerning the civic educational value of
juries deciding provocation.232 She notes that “[j]urors should be
encouraged to deliberate explicitly about social norms, stereotypes,
and bias when deciding what constitutes reasonable provocation . . .
[because they] deliver . . . commonsense justice . . . [and] serve as a
bulwark against overzealous government prosecutors and cynical
judges.”233
While reviewing Lee’s, Murder and the Reasonable Man: Passion
and Fear in the Criminal Courtroom, I considered whether to
Lee’s argument for
recommend abolishing provocation.234
continuing to include the jury in the normative decision of how to
treat men who kill out of rage and jealousy helped convince me that
abolition is probably the wrong response. Both Lee and I prefer that
230. See supra notes 39-47, and accompanying text.
231. See LEE, supra note 18, at 247-50 (discussing some reasons why juries should
still be allowed to finding provocation). Two of the reasons are that juries provide
individualized justice and that the elimination of provocation limits what kinds of
arguments and evidence a criminal defendant can present when a criminal defendant
is at a huge disadvantage vis-a-vis the prosecution from the start. Id.
232. See id. at 247.
233. Id.
234. See Forell, supra note 23, at 599.
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the court educate the jury about the gender and other biases
stemming from existing social norms that provocation law elicits.235
Our goal is to enable the jury to recognize the prejudices that exist in
our society, and thereby, encourage them to empathize with parties
who are not from the traditionally dominant groups.
Very few courts do the kind of explicit gender and other-bias
education of the jury that Lee and I advocate.236 However, perhaps
this is less necessary than in the past. The provocation rules in the
United States, Canada and much of Australia continue to represent
formal gender equality that allows jury empathy for men who kill in a
jealous rage. Nevertheless, changes in social norms have allowed
substantive gender equality to be incorporated in provocation law’s
application by juries, as well as judges and prosecutors. When given
the choice between manslaughter and murder for battered women
who kill, juries prefer manslaughter; in contrast, when given that
choice for killings in the heat of passion, juries prefer murder.237
Therefore, in jurisdictions with mandatory minimum sentences for
murder, domestic homicide law may be as fair and equal as is
currently possible. Until judges are given greater discretion in
sentencing, and the law and application of self-defense is more
understanding of battered women’s situations, current provocation
law, as applied, may be the best that it can be.
Now that two common law jurisdictions have abolished provocation
it is particularly important to consider whether abolition is in fact the
most effective method for achieving maximum substantive gender
equality. In addition to leaving a traditional jury function to judges
and legislatures, abolition runs two risks concerning domestic
homicides: juries acquitting jealous killers rather than convicting
them for murder, and juries convicting battered women of murder
instead of acquitting them. Finally, it labels all convicted intentional
killers, including battered women, as murderers.238 While replacing
provocation with excessive/imperfect self-defense or Victoria’s new
235. See LEE, supra note 18, at 217-20 (switching the genders of the parties in a
case involving provocation); see also Forell, supra note 23, at 614-18 (applying the
reasonable woman standard as to what is ordinary in provocation cases regardless of
the gender of the parties).
236. See LEE, supra note 18, at 256-58 (describing a rare example of a judge
instructing a jury in a way that enables them to empathize with the member of the
non-dominant group).
237. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
238. There are also serious implications for heat of passion killings outside the
domestic homicide area. Abolition of provocation removes it as a partial defense for
these kinds of killings as well. Whether this is a good idea received no consideration
in the deliberations by the Tasmanian and Victorian parliaments when they voted to
abolish provocation. For examples of non-domestic homicide situations, see Stephen
P. Garvey, Passion’s Puzzle, 90 Iowa L. Rev. 1677, 1679 (2005).
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crime of defensive homicide that only apply to killing out of fear
solves half the problem, it leaves only an all or nothing solution for
people who kill in the heat of passion regardless of whether the killing
was a domestic homicide or not.
Canada and some Australian states’ current treatment, which allows
juries to find provocation that results in a manslaughter verdict and
then gives trial judges broad discretion to tailor the sentence, may, in
fact, work better than abolition, so long as most prosecutors, juries
and judges have embraced the view that jealousy and rage are less
deserving emotions than fear and despair. Jurisdictions that have
enlightened provocation rules may provide greater protection for
battered women who kill while also allowing severe punishment of
people who kill out of possessiveness. In particular, two Australian
jurisdictions, Australian Capital Territory239 and New South Wales,240
may have the best solution currently possible. Both have provocation
statutes that have attempted to account for the problems battered
women who kill face when trying to claim provocation. In addition,
neither has a mandatory minimum sentence for manslaughter or
murder. Thus, regardless of whether a jury finds a battered woman
guilty of manslaughter or murder, the trial judge still has the ability to
tailor the sentence to take her circumstances into account.
While changes in the law of provocation may no longer be as
crucial to assuring substantive gender equality, even greater efforts

239. See Crimes Act, 1900, § 13 (Austl. Cap. Terr.).
(1) If, on trial for murder (a) it appears that the act or omission causing
death occurred under provocation; and (b) apart from this subsection and
the provocation, the jury would have found the accused guilty of murder; the
jury shall acquit the accused of murder and find him guilty of manslaughter.
(2) For subsection (1), an act or omission causing death shall be taken to
have occurred under provocation if (a) the act or omission was the result of
the accused’s loss of self-control induced by any conduct of the deceased
(including grossly insulting words or gestures) towards or affecting the
accused; and (b) the conduct of the deceased was such as could have induced
an ordinary person in the position of the accused to have so far lost selfcontrol (i) as to have formed an intent to kill the deceased; or (ii) as to be
recklessly indifferent to the probability of causing deceased’s death; whether
that conduct of the deceased occurred immediately before the act or
omission causing death or at any previous time.
....
(4) For the purpose of determining whether an act or omission causing death
occurred under provocation, there is no rule that provocation is negatived if
(a) there was not a reasonable proportion between the act or omission
causing the death and the conduct of the deceased that induced the act or
omission; or (b) the act or omission causing the death did not occur
suddenly; or (c) the act of omission causing the death occurred with any
intent to take life or inflict grievous bodily harm).
Id.
240. See Crimes Act, 1900, §§ 23, 421 (N.S.W.) (containing substantially similar
content to the provocation statute in the Australian Capital Territory).
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should be made to ensure battered women receive substantive
equality under self-defense law so that more often, when battered
women kill out of fear, they are either not charged or are acquitted.
Unfortunately, regardless of enlightened reforms of both provocation
and self-defense rules, social norms, or as Wendy Williams calls them,
“cultural limits,” may continue to stand in the way of complete
substantive equality for battered women.241 Prosecutors, judges and
jurors may still refuse to fully excuse intentional killing based on fear
where the killing occurs outside the traditional male-biased
circumstances for which self-defense was designed, making retention
of a manslaughter-like option necessary, whether it be provocation,
excessive/imperfect self-defense242 or defensive homicide.
CONCLUSION
Currently, in determining the severity of the punishment for
domestic homicides based on jealous rage or fear, the emphasis is on
different legal actors in different jurisdictions. Some Australian states,
by abolishing provocation, are limiting the participation of the jury in
favor of the trial judge through sentencing.243 Canada and some
Australian states and territories are allowing juries to decide the issue
of provocation, but then giving judges substantial ability to tailor the
sentence for manslaughter to fit the circumstances.244 Finally, in the
United States, juries are allowed to decide whether provocation
existed.245 However, because of the greater variety of determinate
sentencing for both manslaughter and murder, in some states there
may be substantial room for judges to distinguish among people who
plead to or are convicted of manslaughter based on domestic
homicide.246 In others states, regardless of whether the defendant is a
battered woman or a jealous man, a manslaughter sentence is
legislatively determined to be lengthy but less severe than a murder
sentence.247
241. Wendy Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts,
and Feminism, 7 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 175, 176 (1982).
242. See supra notes 150-152 and accompanying text.
243. See generally VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 12.
244. See, e.g., Crimes Act, 1900, § 23(2) (N.S.W.); Crimes Act, 1900, § 13(2)
(Austl. Cap. Terr.); Criminal Code Act Compilation Act, 1913, § 281 (W. Austl.);
Criminal Code, 1899, § 304 (Queensl.).
245. See generally LEE, supra note 18.
246. See supra note 101.
247. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190(a) (first degree murder minimum is twentyfive years); § 193 (a) (noting that “voluntary manslaughter is punishable by
imprisonment in the state prison for three, six, or eleven years); see also NEV. REV.
STAT. § 200.030(4)(b)(3) (first-degree murder sentence minimum is fifty years with
eligibility for parole after twenty years served); § 200.080 (voluntary manslaughter
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Since social values that are more sympathetic to battered women
than jealous men appear to have taken root in all three countries, it is
highly probable that the main reason for Australia’s greater emphasis
on substantive equality in its provocation law, including the
willingness to abolish provocation in some Australian states, is a
convergence of strong feminist advocacy and, in Tasmania, Victoria,
New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory, the lack of
mandatory minimum sentencing rules for either manslaughter or
murder.
Australian jurisdictions have provided a fascinating new chapter in
the history of provocation. Currently in Australia four quite different
provocation regimes exist: (1) Tasmania’s abolition without making
any other changes; (2) Victoria’s abolition while replacing
manslaughter with defensive homicide; (3) New South Wales and
Australian Capital Territory’s retention of a relatively enlightened
version of the traditional provocation defense without a mandatory
minimum sentence for murder; and (4) the rest of Australian
jurisdictions’ retention of traditional provocation rules and
mandatory minimum sentences for murder. Assessing over time how
each of these different treatments affects pleas and verdicts involving
domestic homicides will provide evidence of whether one regime
clearly assures substantive equality better than others.
Changing social values have allowed substantive gender equality to
finally make its way into the law of provocation. In all three countries,
the willingness to make concessions for male anger as a human frailty
in domestic homicide cases appears to be far less prevalent than in the
past, while empathy for battered women who kill has led to
substantive changes in provocation law and in its application. Until
changes in law and social norms relating to determinate sentencing
and self-defense occur, this may be as good as it gets.

minimum is one year).
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